Extended shareholder liability as a means to constrain moral hazard in insured banks
Authors:
- Alexander W. SalterASAlexander W. Salter
- Vipin VeetilVVVipin Veetil
- Lawrence H. WhiteLWLawrence H. White
- 1 February 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 63, 153-160
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
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