Statistical Analysis of Non-Profiling Higher-Order Distinguishers Against Inner Product Masking
- 7 April 2025
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 4008-4023
Abstract
Inner Product Masking (IPM) is one representative masking scheme, which captivates by so-called Security Order Amplification (SOA) property. It is commonly recognized that SOA holds under linear leakages. In this paper, we revisit SOA from a non-profiling attack perspective. Specifically, we conduct statistical analyses on three non-profiling distinguishers, including Pearson Coefficient Distinguisher (PCD), Spearman Coefficient Distinguisher (SCD) and Kruskal-Wallis Distinguisher (KWD). We find a fundamental connection between SCD and KWD such that SCD is a more generic distinguisher which encompasses KWD. Theoretical explanations for why KWD outperforms SCD under non-linear leakages are provided. We also propose a new adjusted SCD and present its optimal form, which bridges the efficiency gap with KWD. Grounded on this, SOA is extensively assessed and the observations are two-fold. On the one hand, we confirm again the effectiveness of SOA under Hamming weight leakage through the statistical analysis of PCD. On the other hand, we show that SOA can not resist rank-based distinguishers even under linear leakages, which has never been revealed before (to the best of our knowledge). At last, we verify the theoretical findings through both simulated and real-world measurements. Our results demonstrate the advantage of rank-based distinguishers in uncovering non-linear relationships hidden in leakage, enriching the tool-set for non-profiling class of side-channel attacks. Remarkably, we provide an adversary perspective to investigate SOA, highlighting that the side-channel resistance promised by SOA is vulnerable even considering the ideal linear leakage models.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Key Research and Development Program of China (2023YFB3106800)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62072398)
- National Cryptologic Science Fund of China (2025NCSF02058)
- National Key Research and Development Program of China (2022YFB3103800)
- European IPCEI Framework, BPI French Contract-PIIEC MICROÉLECTRONIQUE- “Continental-SIC,” (DOS0220282/00-DOS0220284/00)
- BPI French Contract “Soitec-SIC” (DOS0220776-DOS0220774)
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- Connecting and Improving Direct Sum Masking and Inner Product Masking2018
- Consolidating Inner Product Masking2017
- Inner Product Masking for Bitslice Ciphers and Security Order Amplification for Linear Leakages2017
- Power Analysis Attacks2007
- Hardware Countermeasures against DPA – A Statistical Analysis of Their Effectiveness2004
- The EM Side—Channel(s)2003
- Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks2003
- Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software2000
- Differential Power Analysis1999
- Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems1996