Qianmei Wu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Qianmei Wu has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fan Zhang
Zhejiang University
7 shared publications - Shize Guo
School of Cyberspace Security, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China
2 shared publications - Wei Cheng
LTCI, Télécom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Palaiseau, France
2 shared publications - Binbin Chen
Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication - Bohan Xuan
College of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China
1 shared publication - Chengdong Xie
College of Mathematics, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Shooting Falcon with One Fault: A Practical Rowhammer-based Fault Attack against Falcon
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Open AccessShooting Falcon with One Fault: A Practical Rowhammer-based Fault Attack against Falcon
- Open Access
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
A Remote Side-Channel Attack on Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms: A Case Study of ML-KEM on Intel x86
As post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes are standardized, evaluating their resilience to side-channel attacks (SCA) becomes critical. While most prior studies focus on physical SCAs, the practicality of remote SCAs on full implementations of standardized PQCs remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we present the first generic remote power SCA on the Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), evaluated on a modern Intel x86 processor. Our result demonstrates that power traces can be exploited remotely as a plaintext-checking oracle, enabling secret key recovery despite the scheme's theoretical IND-CCA security. Using ML-KEM as a case study, we show that complex microarchitectural mechanisms such as speculative execution and dynamic power management do not eliminate exploitable power leakage. We evaluated our attack on the PQClean implementation, achieving secret key recovery with a success rate up to 99.5%. These findings provide a realistic assessment of PQC leakage behavior on high-end processors and underscore the need for architecture-aware leakage models and co-designed hardware-software defenses to ensure secure PQC deployment in practice.
- 26 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-7
Open AccessA Remote Side-Channel Attack on Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms: A Case Study of ML-KEM on Intel x86
As post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes are standardized, evaluating their resilience to side-channel attacks (SCA) becomes critical. While most prior studies focus on physical SCAs, the practicality of remote SCAs on full implementations of standardized PQCs remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we present the first generic remote power SCA on the Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), evaluated on a modern Intel x86 processor. Our result demonstrates that power traces can be exploited remotely as a plaintext-checking oracle, enabling secret key recovery despite the scheme's theoretical IND-CCA security. Using ML-KEM as a case study, we show that complex microarchitectural mechanisms such as speculative execution and dynamic power management do not eliminate exploitable power leakage. We evaluated our attack on the PQClean implementation, achieving secret key recovery with a success rate up to 99.5%. These findings provide a realistic assessment of PQC leakage behavior on high-end processors and underscore the need for architecture-aware leakage models and co-designed hardware-software defenses to ensure secure PQC deployment in practice.
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (1) , 275-289
VCAlign: An Effective Method for the Removal of Random Delays by Vertical Clustering
Random Delay Insertion (RDI) is one of the most investigated types of hiding countermeasure. Multifarious approaches to compromise RDI have emerged over the past two decades, with a horizontal perspective considering waveform segment as a unit. Interestingly in this paper, we transform such traditional perspective to a novel vertical one and find that the distribution feature of samples extracted vertically exposures the existence of delays directly, which can be exploited for both RDI detection and measurements alignment. On this basis, we conceive a generic approach called VCAlign, leveraging binary classification to align the measurements sample by sample vertically. This approach favors adversaries significantly since it requires no reference trace, no prior knowledge, no profiling stage. As a case study, we further propose a practical paradigm and evaluate it on several RDI-protected implementations on an ARM Cortex-M4 micro-controller. The experimental results demonstrate that VCAlign has a powerful capability to eliminate the delays completely while remaining the encryption-related segments, which can be regarded as an enhanced alignment solution to conquer RDI. We firmly believe that VCAlign is a valid application of instruction effects on physical leakage from the novel vertical perspective that could bring new vitality to the alignment solutions.
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 75 (1) , 275-289
VCAlign: An Effective Method for the Removal of Random Delays by Vertical Clustering
Random Delay Insertion (RDI) is one of the most investigated types of hiding countermeasure. Multifarious approaches to compromise RDI have emerged over the past two decades, with a horizontal perspective considering waveform segment as a unit. Interestingly in this paper, we transform such traditional perspective to a novel vertical one and find that the distribution feature of samples extracted vertically exposures the existence of delays directly, which can be exploited for both RDI detection and measurements alignment. On this basis, we conceive a generic approach called VCAlign, leveraging binary classification to align the measurements sample by sample vertically. This approach favors adversaries significantly since it requires no reference trace, no prior knowledge, no profiling stage. As a case study, we further propose a practical paradigm and evaluate it on several RDI-protected implementations on an ARM Cortex-M4 micro-controller. The experimental results demonstrate that VCAlign has a powerful capability to eliminate the delays completely while remaining the encryption-related segments, which can be regarded as an enhanced alignment solution to conquer RDI. We firmly believe that VCAlign is a valid application of instruction effects on physical leakage from the novel vertical perspective that could bring new vitality to the alignment solutions.
- 22 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22 (6) , 6826-6843
Exploring the Internals of Fault-Induced Data-Level Vulnerabilities in Cryptographic Libraries
Fault-induced vulnerabilities have been studied in various aspects. While traditional fault injection techniques easily detect system-level vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, fault executions can introduce subtle potential vulnerabilities that may not trigger any system-level observable behaviors. These are particularly dangerous in cryptography. Using advanced cryptanalysis methods, these vulnerabilities, such as producing faulty ciphertexts, have been successfully exploited and are regarded as great threats to the security of real-world cryptography. In this way, there is a pressing need to study this very area. Our paper generally explores the internals of the fault-induced data-level vulnerabilities, which are subtle vulnerabilities resulting from faults that may not cause system crashes or overt errors but can expose sensitive information or weaken cryptographic primitives under specific cryptanalytic techniques, in cryptographic libraries. We propose a novel framework which can systematically analyze the vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries under different fault models. By employing this method, we identified numerous critical fault locations that could undermine the security of cryptographic systems across a broad spectrum of libraries, fault models, and platforms. Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive analysis of select case studies, and engage in detailed discussions about the strategies to alleviate such vulnerabilities.
- 22 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 22 (6) , 6826-6843
Exploring the Internals of Fault-Induced Data-Level Vulnerabilities in Cryptographic Libraries
Fault-induced vulnerabilities have been studied in various aspects. While traditional fault injection techniques easily detect system-level vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, fault executions can introduce subtle potential vulnerabilities that may not trigger any system-level observable behaviors. These are particularly dangerous in cryptography. Using advanced cryptanalysis methods, these vulnerabilities, such as producing faulty ciphertexts, have been successfully exploited and are regarded as great threats to the security of real-world cryptography. In this way, there is a pressing need to study this very area. Our paper generally explores the internals of the fault-induced data-level vulnerabilities, which are subtle vulnerabilities resulting from faults that may not cause system crashes or overt errors but can expose sensitive information or weaken cryptographic primitives under specific cryptanalytic techniques, in cryptographic libraries. We propose a novel framework which can systematically analyze the vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries under different fault models. By employing this method, we identified numerous critical fault locations that could undermine the security of cryptographic systems across a broad spectrum of libraries, fault models, and platforms. Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive analysis of select case studies, and engage in detailed discussions about the strategies to alleviate such vulnerabilities.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 4008-4023
Statistical Analysis of Non-Profiling Higher-Order Distinguishers Against Inner Product Masking
Inner Product Masking (IPM) is one representative masking scheme, which captivates by so-called Security Order Amplification (SOA) property. It is commonly recognized that SOA holds under linear leakages. In this paper, we revisit SOA from a non-profiling attack perspective. Specifically, we conduct statistical analyses on three non-profiling distinguishers, including Pearson Coefficient Distinguisher (PCD), Spearman Coefficient Distinguisher (SCD) and Kruskal-Wallis Distinguisher (KWD). We find a fundamental connection between SCD and KWD such that SCD is a more generic distinguisher which encompasses KWD. Theoretical explanations for why KWD outperforms SCD under non-linear leakages are provided. We also propose a new adjusted SCD and present its optimal form, which bridges the efficiency gap with KWD. Grounded on this, SOA is extensively assessed and the observations are two-fold. On the one hand, we confirm again the effectiveness of SOA under Hamming weight leakage through the statistical analysis of PCD. On the other hand, we show that SOA can not resist rank-based distinguishers even under linear leakages, which has never been revealed before (to the best of our knowledge). At last, we verify the theoretical findings through both simulated and real-world measurements. Our results demonstrate the advantage of rank-based distinguishers in uncovering non-linear relationships hidden in leakage, enriching the tool-set for non-profiling class of side-channel attacks. Remarkably, we provide an adversary perspective to investigate SOA, highlighting that the side-channel resistance promised by SOA is vulnerable even considering the ideal linear leakage models.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 4008-4023
Statistical Analysis of Non-Profiling Higher-Order Distinguishers Against Inner Product Masking
Inner Product Masking (IPM) is one representative masking scheme, which captivates by so-called Security Order Amplification (SOA) property. It is commonly recognized that SOA holds under linear leakages. In this paper, we revisit SOA from a non-profiling attack perspective. Specifically, we conduct statistical analyses on three non-profiling distinguishers, including Pearson Coefficient Distinguisher (PCD), Spearman Coefficient Distinguisher (SCD) and Kruskal-Wallis Distinguisher (KWD). We find a fundamental connection between SCD and KWD such that SCD is a more generic distinguisher which encompasses KWD. Theoretical explanations for why KWD outperforms SCD under non-linear leakages are provided. We also propose a new adjusted SCD and present its optimal form, which bridges the efficiency gap with KWD. Grounded on this, SOA is extensively assessed and the observations are two-fold. On the one hand, we confirm again the effectiveness of SOA under Hamming weight leakage through the statistical analysis of PCD. On the other hand, we show that SOA can not resist rank-based distinguishers even under linear leakages, which has never been revealed before (to the best of our knowledge). At last, we verify the theoretical findings through both simulated and real-world measurements. Our results demonstrate the advantage of rank-based distinguishers in uncovering non-linear relationships hidden in leakage, enriching the tool-set for non-profiling class of side-channel attacks. Remarkably, we provide an adversary perspective to investigate SOA, highlighting that the side-channel resistance promised by SOA is vulnerable even considering the ideal linear leakage models.
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 73 (9) , 2206-2219
A Unified and Fully Automated Framework for Wavelet-Based Attacks on Random Delay
As a common defense against side-channel attacks, random delay insertion introduces noise into the executive flow of encryption, which increases attack complexity. Accordingly, various techniques are exploited to mitigate the defense effect of such insertions. As an advanced mathematical technique, wavelet analysis is considered to be a more effective technology according to its detailed and comprehensive interpretation of signals. In this paper, we propose a unified and fully automated wavelet-based attack framework (denoted as UWAF ), whose data processing is kept within one unified wavelet domain, with three enhanced components: denoising, alignment and key extraction. We put forward a new idea of combining machine learning with wavelet analysis to realize the full automation of the program for attack framework, rendering it possible to search exhaustively for the optimal combination of parameter settings in wavelet transform. Our proposal finds a new setting of wavelet parameters that have not been exploited ever before and achieves the performance enhancement for about 20 times fewer traces required for successful key recovery. UWAF is compared with several mainstream attack frameworks. Experimental results show that it outperforms those counterparts, and can be considered as an effective framework-level solution to defeat the countermeasure of random delay insertion.
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computers
- Vol. 73 (9) , 2206-2219
A Unified and Fully Automated Framework for Wavelet-Based Attacks on Random Delay
As a common defense against side-channel attacks, random delay insertion introduces noise into the executive flow of encryption, which increases attack complexity. Accordingly, various techniques are exploited to mitigate the defense effect of such insertions. As an advanced mathematical technique, wavelet analysis is considered to be a more effective technology according to its detailed and comprehensive interpretation of signals. In this paper, we propose a unified and fully automated wavelet-based attack framework (denoted as UWAF ), whose data processing is kept within one unified wavelet domain, with three enhanced components: denoising, alignment and key extraction. We put forward a new idea of combining machine learning with wavelet analysis to realize the full automation of the program for attack framework, rendering it possible to search exhaustively for the optimal combination of parameter settings in wavelet transform. Our proposal finds a new setting of wavelet parameters that have not been exploited ever before and achieves the performance enhancement for about 20 times fewer traces required for successful key recovery. UWAF is compared with several mainstream attack frameworks. Experimental results show that it outperforms those counterparts, and can be considered as an effective framework-level solution to defeat the countermeasure of random delay insertion.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 49 (11) , 4829-4845
Constructing Cyber-Physical System Testing Suites Using Active Sensor Fuzzing
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) automating critical public infrastructure face a pervasive threat of attack, motivating research into different types of countermeasures. Assessing the effectiveness of these countermeasures is challenging, however, as benchmarks are difficult to construct manually, existing automated testing solutions often make unrealistic assumptions, and blindly fuzzing is ineffective at finding attacks due to the enormous search spaces and resource requirements. In this work, we propose active sensor fuzzing , a fully automated approach for building test suites without requiring any a prior knowledge about a CPS. Our approach employs active learning techniques. Applied to a real-world water treatment system, our approach manages to find attacks that drive the system into 15 different unsafe states involving water flow, pressure, and tank levels, including nine that were not covered by an established attack benchmark. Furthermore, we successfully generate targeted multi-point attacks which have been long suspected to be possible. We reveal that active sensor fuzzing successfully extends the attack benchmarks generated by our previous work, an ML-guided fuzzing tool, with two more kinds of attacks. Finally, we investigate the impact of active learning on models and the reason that the model trained with active learning is able to discover more attacks.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 49 (11) , 4829-4845
Constructing Cyber-Physical System Testing Suites Using Active Sensor Fuzzing
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) automating critical public infrastructure face a pervasive threat of attack, motivating research into different types of countermeasures. Assessing the effectiveness of these countermeasures is challenging, however, as benchmarks are difficult to construct manually, existing automated testing solutions often make unrealistic assumptions, and blindly fuzzing is ineffective at finding attacks due to the enormous search spaces and resource requirements. In this work, we propose active sensor fuzzing , a fully automated approach for building test suites without requiring any a prior knowledge about a CPS. Our approach employs active learning techniques. Applied to a real-world water treatment system, our approach manages to find attacks that drive the system into 15 different unsafe states involving water flow, pressure, and tank levels, including nine that were not covered by an established attack benchmark. Furthermore, we successfully generate targeted multi-point attacks which have been long suspected to be possible. We reveal that active sensor fuzzing successfully extends the attack benchmarks generated by our previous work, an ML-guided fuzzing tool, with two more kinds of attacks. Finally, we investigate the impact of active learning on models and the reason that the model trained with active learning is able to discover more attacks.