Bermúdez’s view on inner speech
Open Access
- 12 May 2025
- journal article
- Published by EHU Press in THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Abstract
José Luis Bermúdez defends the view that inner speech is necessary for thinking about thoughts, what he calls ‘intentional ascent’. On his account, we can only take a thought as an object of further thought if the target thought is “held in mind” in inner speech in a way that its canonical structure is revealed. Two paradigm cases exemplify this view: reflexive evaluation and propositional mindreading. In this article, we examine Bermúdez’s view and argue that 1) the process of intentional ascent via inner speech is empirically untenable and psychologically unrealistic, and that 2) the view, in demanding that words reveal the canonical structure of thoughts, runs into a dilemma where inner speech becomes either superfluous or inaccurately described. We finish by gesturing towards a more encompassing view of the role of inner speech in thinking that, while rejecting Bermúdez’s more problematic claims, maintains his main insight of the relevant role of inner speech for human cognition.Keywords
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- The early emergence and puzzling decline of relational reasoning: Effects of knowledge and search on inferring abstract conceptsCognition, 2016
- Inner speech: Development, cognitive functions, phenomenology, and neurobiology.Psychological Bulletin, 2015
- Where science starts: Spontaneous experiments in preschoolers’ exploratory playCognition, 2011
- Unsymbolized thinkingConsciousness and Cognition, 2008
- Thinking Without Words: An Overview for Animal EthicsThe Journal of Ethics, 2007
- Do infants really understand false belief?Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005
- Alien voices and inner dialogue: towards a developmental account of auditory verbal hallucinationsNew Ideas in Psychology, 2004
- Magic words: how language augments human computation1998
- Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deceptionCognition, 1983
- Competing with reasoning: A test of the working memory hypothesisCurrent Psychology, 1981