MJMarta Jorba

Marta Jorba

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Marta Jorba has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Case of ‘Autistic’: Pejorative Uses and Reclamation

    by Bianca Cepollaro, Marta Jorba, Valentina Petrolini

    In addition to its descriptive uses, ‘autistic’—originally a medical label—is also used pejoratively (against ingroups and outgroups), and has recently been proudly reclaimed, especially in connection with neurodiversity movements. This phenomenon raises interesting questions for the philosophical debate on pejoratives. In this paper, we focus on two such questions: (i) Is ‘autistic’ a pejorative term? And (ii), How is ‘autistic’ being reclaimed? As for (i), we argue that ‘autistic’ doesn’t look like a prototypical slur, nor like a prototypical ESTI (Ethnic/Social Term used as an Insult), nor like a derived pejorative, but displays a mixed behavior that approximates these kinds of terms. Our observations point towards the need for a broader conception of oppressive speech, beyond the most standard instances. As for (ii), we illustrate the analogies and disanalogies between the reclamation of ‘autistic’ and that of prototypical slurs. What’s peculiar about reclaimed uses of ‘autistic’ is that they do not merely respond to derogatory uses of the term that abuse ingroups, but they (also) react to the introduction of alternative expressions (like ‘person with autism’) that are perceived as offensively euphemistic. This work adds to the contemporary literature in social philosophy of language, by encouraging scholars to make room for terms that can be used pejoratively and display a peculiar mixed behavior. Moreover, it highlights a further function of reclamation that goes beyond repurposing pejorative labels, which is to reject certain euphemistic expressions by representing some ways of being and living as positive and legitimate.


  • Open Access

    Francesc Perenya. In Memoriam

    by Marta Jorba

    Empezaré mi intervención diciendo que me ha costado mucho encontrar el tono adecuado para esta comunicación. Tengo la sensación de que no ha pasado todavía tiempo suficiente desde que Francesc nos dejó para poder hablar sobre él en un homenaje, porque hay aspectos sobre los que pensar que toman su tiempo y requieren cierta perspectiva. Se requiere la distancia de la teoría, si queréis, de la que hablan los fenomenólogos, el distanciamiento del objeto tematizado —un tema, por cierto, que Francesc introducía en sus clases a través de Ser y Tiempo de Heidegger y del famoso ejemplo del martillo. Una actitud (teórica) hacia las cosas que muchas veces es posible sólo cuando el martillo de rompe, o sólo cuando alguien ya no está, en su ausencia. Hay aspectos del tematizar la ausencia de alguien que creo que solo aparecen con el tiempo y a veces sin esperarlos o precisamente sin querer pensarlos, sino que se viven y se sienten de un modo «implícito», como sedimentos que lentamente van haciendo pozo a medida que la vida nos presenta situaciones (parecidas a las de antes o nuevas) en que personas que antes estaban ahora ya no. Aunque quizás es reciente todavía, como decía, sí que es verdad que ya se han ido dando momentos, y el tiempo suficiente para que estos sedimentos vayan aflorando a la superficie y nos vayamos dando cuenta de ellos, para así poderlos llevar a la atención y a la palabra.

  • Open Access

    The inner speech and visualization in verbal autism questionnaire: A study and preliminary validation

    by Marta Jorba, Alba Raventós, Ares Batlle, Alberto Sánchez, Agustín Vicente

  • Open Access

    Bermúdez’s view on inner speech

    by Daphne Bernués, Marta Jorba

    José Luis Bermúdez defends the view that inner speech is necessary for thinking about thoughts, what he calls ‘intentional ascent’. On his account, we can only take a thought as an object of further thought if the target thought is “held in mind” in inner speech in a way that its canonical structure is revealed. Two paradigm cases exemplify this view: reflexive evaluation and propositional mindreading. In this article, we examine Bermúdez’s view and argue that 1) the process of intentional ascent via inner speech is empirically untenable and psychologically unrealistic, and that 2) the view, in demanding that words reveal the canonical structure of thoughts, runs into a dilemma where inner speech becomes either superfluous or inaccurately described. We finish by gesturing towards a more encompassing view of the role of inner speech in thinking that, while rejecting Bermúdez’s more problematic claims, maintains his main insight of the relevant role of inner speech for human cognition.


  • Open Access

    Person-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications

    by Marta Jorba, Valentina Petrolini, Bianca Cepollaro


  • Open Access

    Intersectionality as emergence

    by Marta Jorba, Dan López de Sa

    Intersectionality is the notion that concerns the complexity of the experiences of individuals in virtue of their belonging to multiple socially significant categories. One of its main insights is that the way society is structured around categories such as gender, race, sexuality, class, etc., produces distinctive and specific forms of discrimination and privilege for groups in the intersections. In this paper, we suggest conceiving intersectionality as a general metaphysical framework wherein specific claims to the effect that the experiences of discrimination of Black women, among others, can be fruitfully formulated and examined. The main claim is that intersectional experiences emerge from the conjunction of social categories when social structures make them relevant vis-à-vis discrimination and privilege. We then argue that our view has three main virtues: metaphysical neutrality, explanatory flexibility and methodological openness. Explaining these virtues will allow us to contrast our proposal with alternatives from the recent literature.


  • Open Access

    Correction to: Perceptual Motivation for Action

    by Tom McClelland, Marta Jorba

  • Open Access

    Perceptual Motivation for Action

    by Tom McClelland, Marta Jorba

    In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conative, Imperativist, Reflexive and Dual Content views. Some of these have been developed in detail and others are natural extensions of existing views. However, we argue that none provides a satisfactory account of the target perceptual states. Driven by the failings of each account, we identify three conditions that any satisfactory theory of perceptual motivation must meet: Direct Motivational Force, Non-Obligatory Force and Intention-Independent Influence. Then we offer an account that attempts to fulfil these conditions: the Affordance Model. This model of perceptual motivation is premised on the claim that each of the target states involves the perception of a specific affordance for action and the triggering of Automatic Motor Initiations (AMIs). We suggest that AMIs can explain the motivational force of these perceptual states.