Marta Jorba
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Marta Jorba has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Agustín Vicente
Ikerbasque & Department of Linguistics and Basque Studies, University of the Basque Country (EHU/UPV), Justo Vélez de Elorriaga Kalea, 1, 01006, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Araba, Spain; Ikerbasque:Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain
2 shared publications- Bianca Cepollaro
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy
2 shared publications - Maria Rodó-Zárate
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
2 shared publications - Tom McClelland
Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Cambridge Cambridge UK
2 shared publications - Agustín Vicente
Department of Linguistics and Basque Studies, University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain
1 shared publication Alba Raventós
Department of Humanities, Pompeu Fabra University, c/Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005, Barcelona, Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 452-468
Introspection and Inner Speech
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 13
The Case of ‘Autistic’: Pejorative Uses and Reclamation
In addition to its descriptive uses, ‘autistic’—originally a medical label—is also used pejoratively (against ingroups and outgroups), and has recently been proudly reclaimed, especially in connection with neurodiversity movements. This phenomenon raises interesting questions for the philosophical debate on pejoratives. In this paper, we focus on two such questions: (i) Is ‘autistic’ a pejorative term? And (ii), How is ‘autistic’ being reclaimed? As for (i), we argue that ‘autistic’ doesn’t look like a prototypical slur, nor like a prototypical ESTI (Ethnic/Social Term used as an Insult), nor like a derived pejorative, but displays a mixed behavior that approximates these kinds of terms. Our observations point towards the need for a broader conception of oppressive speech, beyond the most standard instances. As for (ii), we illustrate the analogies and disanalogies between the reclamation of ‘autistic’ and that of prototypical slurs. What’s peculiar about reclaimed uses of ‘autistic’ is that they do not merely respond to derogatory uses of the term that abuse ingroups, but they (also) react to the introduction of alternative expressions (like ‘person with autism’) that are perceived as offensively euphemistic. This work adds to the contemporary literature in social philosophy of language, by encouraging scholars to make room for terms that can be used pejoratively and display a peculiar mixed behavior. Moreover, it highlights a further function of reclamation that goes beyond repurposing pejorative labels, which is to reject certain euphemistic expressions by representing some ways of being and living as positive and legitimate.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 13
Open AccessThe Case of ‘Autistic’: Pejorative Uses and Reclamation
In addition to its descriptive uses, ‘autistic’—originally a medical label—is also used pejoratively (against ingroups and outgroups), and has recently been proudly reclaimed, especially in connection with neurodiversity movements. This phenomenon raises interesting questions for the philosophical debate on pejoratives. In this paper, we focus on two such questions: (i) Is ‘autistic’ a pejorative term? And (ii), How is ‘autistic’ being reclaimed? As for (i), we argue that ‘autistic’ doesn’t look like a prototypical slur, nor like a prototypical ESTI (Ethnic/Social Term used as an Insult), nor like a derived pejorative, but displays a mixed behavior that approximates these kinds of terms. Our observations point towards the need for a broader conception of oppressive speech, beyond the most standard instances. As for (ii), we illustrate the analogies and disanalogies between the reclamation of ‘autistic’ and that of prototypical slurs. What’s peculiar about reclaimed uses of ‘autistic’ is that they do not merely respond to derogatory uses of the term that abuse ingroups, but they (also) react to the introduction of alternative expressions (like ‘person with autism’) that are perceived as offensively euphemistic. This work adds to the contemporary literature in social philosophy of language, by encouraging scholars to make room for terms that can be used pejoratively and display a peculiar mixed behavior. Moreover, it highlights a further function of reclamation that goes beyond repurposing pejorative labels, which is to reject certain euphemistic expressions by representing some ways of being and living as positive and legitimate.
- Open Access
- 26 December 2025
- Published by UNED - Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia in Investigaciones Fenomenológicas
- No. 22,p. 57-60
Francesc Perenya. In Memoriam
Empezaré mi intervención diciendo que me ha costado mucho encontrar el tono adecuado para esta comunicación. Tengo la sensación de que no ha pasado todavía tiempo suficiente desde que Francesc nos dejó para poder hablar sobre él en un homenaje, porque hay aspectos sobre los que pensar que toman su tiempo y requieren cierta perspectiva. Se requiere la distancia de la teoría, si queréis, de la que hablan los fenomenólogos, el distanciamiento del objeto tematizado —un tema, por cierto, que Francesc introducía en sus clases a través de Ser y Tiempo de Heidegger y del famoso ejemplo del martillo. Una actitud (teórica) hacia las cosas que muchas veces es posible sólo cuando el martillo de rompe, o sólo cuando alguien ya no está, en su ausencia. Hay aspectos del tematizar la ausencia de alguien que creo que solo aparecen con el tiempo y a veces sin esperarlos o precisamente sin querer pensarlos, sino que se viven y se sienten de un modo «implícito», como sedimentos que lentamente van haciendo pozo a medida que la vida nos presenta situaciones (parecidas a las de antes o nuevas) en que personas que antes estaban ahora ya no. Aunque quizás es reciente todavía, como decía, sí que es verdad que ya se han ido dando momentos, y el tiempo suficiente para que estos sedimentos vayan aflorando a la superficie y nos vayamos dando cuenta de ellos, para así poderlos llevar a la atención y a la palabra.
- 26 December 2025
- Published by UNED - Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia in Investigaciones Fenomenológicas
- No. 22,p. 57-60
Open AccessFrancesc Perenya. In Memoriam
Empezaré mi intervención diciendo que me ha costado mucho encontrar el tono adecuado para esta comunicación. Tengo la sensación de que no ha pasado todavía tiempo suficiente desde que Francesc nos dejó para poder hablar sobre él en un homenaje, porque hay aspectos sobre los que pensar que toman su tiempo y requieren cierta perspectiva. Se requiere la distancia de la teoría, si queréis, de la que hablan los fenomenólogos, el distanciamiento del objeto tematizado —un tema, por cierto, que Francesc introducía en sus clases a través de Ser y Tiempo de Heidegger y del famoso ejemplo del martillo. Una actitud (teórica) hacia las cosas que muchas veces es posible sólo cuando el martillo de rompe, o sólo cuando alguien ya no está, en su ausencia. Hay aspectos del tematizar la ausencia de alguien que creo que solo aparecen con el tiempo y a veces sin esperarlos o precisamente sin querer pensarlos, sino que se viven y se sienten de un modo «implícito», como sedimentos que lentamente van haciendo pozo a medida que la vida nos presenta situaciones (parecidas a las de antes o nuevas) en que personas que antes estaban ahora ya no. Aunque quizás es reciente todavía, como decía, sí que es verdad que ya se han ido dando momentos, y el tiempo suficiente para que estos sedimentos vayan aflorando a la superficie y nos vayamos dando cuenta de ellos, para así poderlos llevar a la atención y a la palabra.
- Open Access
- 10 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 262, 106039
The inner speech and visualization in verbal autism questionnaire: A study and preliminary validation
- 10 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 262, 106039
Open AccessThe inner speech and visualization in verbal autism questionnaire: A study and preliminary validation
- Open Access
- 12 May 2025
- Published by EHU Press in THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Bermúdez’s view on inner speech
José Luis Bermúdez defends the view that inner speech is necessary for thinking about thoughts, what he calls ‘intentional ascent’. On his account, we can only take a thought as an object of further thought if the target thought is “held in mind” in inner speech in a way that its canonical structure is revealed. Two paradigm cases exemplify this view: reflexive evaluation and propositional mindreading. In this article, we examine Bermúdez’s view and argue that 1) the process of intentional ascent via inner speech is empirically untenable and psychologically unrealistic, and that 2) the view, in demanding that words reveal the canonical structure of thoughts, runs into a dilemma where inner speech becomes either superfluous or inaccurately described. We finish by gesturing towards a more encompassing view of the role of inner speech in thinking that, while rejecting Bermúdez’s more problematic claims, maintains his main insight of the relevant role of inner speech for human cognition.
- 12 May 2025
- Published by EHU Press in THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Open AccessBermúdez’s view on inner speech
José Luis Bermúdez defends the view that inner speech is necessary for thinking about thoughts, what he calls ‘intentional ascent’. On his account, we can only take a thought as an object of further thought if the target thought is “held in mind” in inner speech in a way that its canonical structure is revealed. Two paradigm cases exemplify this view: reflexive evaluation and propositional mindreading. In this article, we examine Bermúdez’s view and argue that 1) the process of intentional ascent via inner speech is empirically untenable and psychologically unrealistic, and that 2) the view, in demanding that words reveal the canonical structure of thoughts, runs into a dilemma where inner speech becomes either superfluous or inaccurately described. We finish by gesturing towards a more encompassing view of the role of inner speech in thinking that, while rejecting Bermúdez’s more problematic claims, maintains his main insight of the relevant role of inner speech for human cognition.
- Open Access
- 15 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (3) , 1-19
Person-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications
- 15 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 204 (3) , 1-19
Open AccessPerson-first and identity-first approaches to Autism: metaphysical and linguistic implications
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (7) , 1579-1589
Mind in action: expanding the concept of affordance
- 10 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (7) , 1579-1589
Mind in action: expanding the concept of affordance
- Open Access
- 29 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (6-7) , 1455-1475
Intersectionality as emergence
Intersectionality is the notion that concerns the complexity of the experiences of individuals in virtue of their belonging to multiple socially significant categories. One of its main insights is that the way society is structured around categories such as gender, race, sexuality, class, etc., produces distinctive and specific forms of discrimination and privilege for groups in the intersections. In this paper, we suggest conceiving intersectionality as a general metaphysical framework wherein specific claims to the effect that the experiences of discrimination of Black women, among others, can be fruitfully formulated and examined. The main claim is that intersectional experiences emerge from the conjunction of social categories when social structures make them relevant vis-à-vis discrimination and privilege. We then argue that our view has three main virtues: metaphysical neutrality, explanatory flexibility and methodological openness. Explaining these virtues will allow us to contrast our proposal with alternatives from the recent literature.
- 29 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (6-7) , 1455-1475
Open AccessIntersectionality as emergence
Intersectionality is the notion that concerns the complexity of the experiences of individuals in virtue of their belonging to multiple socially significant categories. One of its main insights is that the way society is structured around categories such as gender, race, sexuality, class, etc., produces distinctive and specific forms of discrimination and privilege for groups in the intersections. In this paper, we suggest conceiving intersectionality as a general metaphysical framework wherein specific claims to the effect that the experiences of discrimination of Black women, among others, can be fruitfully formulated and examined. The main claim is that intersectional experiences emerge from the conjunction of social categories when social structures make them relevant vis-à-vis discrimination and privilege. We then argue that our view has three main virtues: metaphysical neutrality, explanatory flexibility and methodological openness. Explaining these virtues will allow us to contrast our proposal with alternatives from the recent literature.
- Open Access
- 17 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 13 (2) , 527
Correction to: Perceptual Motivation for Action
- 17 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 13 (2) , 527
Open AccessCorrection to: Perceptual Motivation for Action
- Open Access
- 19 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 14 (3) , 939-958
Perceptual Motivation for Action
In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conative, Imperativist, Reflexive and Dual Content views. Some of these have been developed in detail and others are natural extensions of existing views. However, we argue that none provides a satisfactory account of the target perceptual states. Driven by the failings of each account, we identify three conditions that any satisfactory theory of perceptual motivation must meet: Direct Motivational Force, Non-Obligatory Force and Intention-Independent Influence. Then we offer an account that attempts to fulfil these conditions: the Affordance Model. This model of perceptual motivation is premised on the claim that each of the target states involves the perception of a specific affordance for action and the triggering of Automatic Motor Initiations (AMIs). We suggest that AMIs can explain the motivational force of these perceptual states.
- 19 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 14 (3) , 939-958
Open AccessPerceptual Motivation for Action
In this paper we focus on a kind of perceptual states that we call perceptual motivations, that is, perceptual experiences that plausibly motivate us to act, such as itching, perceptual salience and pain. Itching seems to motivate you to scratch, perceiving a stimulus as salient seems to motivate you to attend to it and feeling a pain in your hand seems to motivate actions such as withdrawing from the painful stimulus. Five main accounts of perceptual motivation are available: Descriptive, Conative, Imperativist, Reflexive and Dual Content views. Some of these have been developed in detail and others are natural extensions of existing views. However, we argue that none provides a satisfactory account of the target perceptual states. Driven by the failings of each account, we identify three conditions that any satisfactory theory of perceptual motivation must meet: Direct Motivational Force, Non-Obligatory Force and Intention-Independent Influence. Then we offer an account that attempts to fulfil these conditions: the Affordance Model. This model of perceptual motivation is premised on the claim that each of the target states involves the perception of a specific affordance for action and the triggering of Automatic Motor Initiations (AMIs). We suggest that AMIs can explain the motivational force of these perceptual states.