“Now or Later?” When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing
- 1 November 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 69 (6) , 1715-1733
Abstract
Designing Open-bid Procurement Auction with Supplier Qualification Screenings Manufacturers often use re-sourcing initiatives to keep their suppliers’ pricing competitive; e.g., new entrant suppliers are identified and invited to compete with the incumbent supplier for supply contracts in an open-bid auction. To ensure that entrant suppliers have the capability of executing the contract, the conventional approach for many manufacturers is to conduct qualification screenings on all the entrants prior to auction bidding and only allow qualified entrant suppliers to compete in the auction. In “‘Now or Later?’ When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing”, Zhang, Chen, and Katok explore an alternative arrangement of this process where all entrant suppliers are invited for bidding first before qualification screenings are selectively conducted afterward to determine the contract winner. This new approach helps reduce the waste of manufacturers’ screening efforts on suppliers with uncompetitive bids but in the meantime introduces incentives for less competitive supplier bidding behavior. They provide analytical and numerical evidence that this new approach could be very effective in managing manufacturers’ procurement costs.Keywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?Economic Theory Bulletin, 2016
- Split-Award Auctions for Supplier RetentionManagement Science, 2014
- When Does It Pay to Delay Supplier Qualification? Theory and ExperimentsManagement Science, 2012
- Optimal Procurement Design in the Presence of Supply RiskManufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2011
- RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification ScreeningOperations Research, 2009
- Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not PracticalOperations Research, 2007
- Dynamic auctions in procurement2006
- Log-concave probability and its applicationsEconomic Theory, 2005
- Supply Contract Competition and Sourcing PoliciesManufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2000
- Optimal Auction DesignMathematics of Operations Research, 1981