QCQi (George) Chen

Qi (George) Chen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Qi (George) Chen has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The Sooner, the Better? Optimal Vaccination Policy with Limited Vaccine Supply

    by Miao Bai, Qi (George) Chen, Cuihong Li

    We study the optimal single-dose vaccination policy during an infectious disease outbreak, considering both limited vaccine supply and imperfect efficacy, which provides partial immunity to each vaccinated individual. The inclusion of imperfect efficacy introduces an additional compartment to the celebrated Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model, giving rise to an infinite horizon nonlinear optimal control problem. We derive a closed-form expression for the optimal vaccination policy under infinite administrative capacity and establish theoretical structures of the optimal policy under finite capacity. Our results suggest that delaying the start of the vaccination process may be optimal, especially when the vaccine is less effective, the vaccine supply is more limited, and the disease is more infectious. We identify key terms as an integral part of the analysis that characterize the individual-level benefit of vaccination and, importantly, provide insights into the intuition behind vaccination delay. Building on these theoretical findings, our numerical study verifies these insights based on sensitivity results. We demonstrate the significant benefit of delay in reducing the total number of infections compared to policies without delay. Furthermore, we extend our analysis to alternative model dynamics and objective functions, confirming that our key findings remain robust and our methodology applicable across different settings. Additionally, we develop a general framework and provide guidance for applying the methodology to broader epidemic settings. Our study contributes to the methodological framework to analyze optimal vaccination policies for infectious disease control, and uncovers an important policy structure — vaccination delay — that has been overlooked in the literature but has important implications for practice.

  • Open Access

    A simple statistical model and physical device to estimate a woman-specific probability of skilled birth assistance and associated benefit of maternity waiting home stay

    by Jérémie Gallien, Qi George Chen, Yuhang Du, Yi Zhang, Jody Lori, Joseph Sieka, Bentoe Tehoungue

    This paper presents a simple mathematical model and an associated physical device to predict (i) the risk that a woman’s active labour will begin without a skilled birth attendant based on her parity and anticipated time to access skilled care; and (ii) the extent to which that risk may be reduced by moving to a maternity waiting home some time before her expected due date. This tool is designed to facilitate more systematic discussions and better-informed decisions about labour care access arrangements during antenatal consultations.


  • Real-Time Spatial–Intertemporal Pricing and Relocation in a Ride-Hailing Network: Near-Optimal Policies and the Value of Dynamic Pricing

    by Qi (George) Chen, Yanzhe (Murray) Lei, Stefanus Jasin

    In “Real-Time Spatial–Intertemporal Pricing and Relocation in a Ride-Hailing Network: Near-Optimal Policies and The Value of Dynamic Pricing,” Chen, Lei, and Jasin consider a dynamic pricing problem faced by a ride-hailing service provider who manages a fixed number of servers and serves price-sensitive customers within a network. Servers serve arriving customers by relocating from the requested origins to destinations within a certain travel time. The authors first propose a static pricing policy based on the optimal solution to a deterministic relaxation of the original stochastic problem. They show that the proposed static policy matches the best possible asymptotic performance of any static policy. The authors further propose a dynamic pricing policy that adaptively changes the prices in a way that reduces the impact of past demand randomness on the balance of future distributions of servers and customers across the network. They show that the dynamic pricing policy achieves significantly better asymptotical performance. The proposed policies and their performance guarantees are further extended to a case where the firm jointly decides the relocation of vacant servers


  • Open Access

    A simple mathematical model and physical device to estimate a woman-specific probability of skilled birth assistance and associated benefit of maternity waiting home stay

    by Jérémie Gallien, George Chen, Yi Zhang, Yuhang Du, Jody Lori, Joseph Sieka, Bentoe Tehoungue

    This paper presents a simple mathematical model and an associated physical device to predict (i) the risk that a woman’s active labor will begin without a skilled birth attendant based on her parity and anticipated time to access skilled care; and (ii) the extent to which that risk may be reduced by moving to a maternity waiting home some time before her expected due date. This tool is designed to facilitate more systematic discussions and better-informed decisions about labour care access arrangements during antenatal consultations.

  • Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations

    by Qi (George) Chen, Damian R. Beil, Izak Duenyas

    Integrating Cost Reduction and Supplier Selection Activities Manufacturers who outsource production may find ways to reduce suppliers’ cost to lower the contract price. Conventionally, this is done after supplier selection. However, in practice, a sizable portion of the degree to which the manufacturer can help a supplier reduce cost could be learned before the supplier starts production. This opens up a possibility to better integrate supplier selection and cost-reduction activities. In “Procurement Mechanisms with Postauction Preaward Cost-Reduction Investigations,” Chen, Beil, and Duenyas explore an alternative procurement process wherein, after suppliers’ initial pricing bids are collected, the manufacturer investigates suppliers’ cost-saving potential and then leverages this information to select the contract winner. They provide analytical and numerical evidence that this integrated procurement process not only helps the manufacturers reduce cost significantly, but also benefits the suppliers in many plausible scenarios.


  • “Now or Later?” When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing

    by Wen Zhang, Qi (George) Chen, Elena Katok

    Designing Open-bid Procurement Auction with Supplier Qualification Screenings Manufacturers often use re-sourcing initiatives to keep their suppliers’ pricing competitive; e.g., new entrant suppliers are identified and invited to compete with the incumbent supplier for supply contracts in an open-bid auction. To ensure that entrant suppliers have the capability of executing the contract, the conventional approach for many manufacturers is to conduct qualification screenings on all the entrants prior to auction bidding and only allow qualified entrant suppliers to compete in the auction. In “‘Now or Later?’ When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing”, Zhang, Chen, and Katok explore an alternative arrangement of this process where all entrant suppliers are invited for bidding first before qualification screenings are selectively conducted afterward to determine the contract winner. This new approach helps reduce the waste of manufacturers’ screening efforts on suppliers with uncompetitive bids but in the meantime introduces incentives for less competitive supplier bidding behavior. They provide analytical and numerical evidence that this new approach could be very effective in managing manufacturers’ procurement costs.


  • Nonparametric Self-Adjusting Control for Joint Learning and Optimization of Multiproduct Pricing with Finite Resource Capacity

    by Qi (George) Chen, Stefanus Jasin, Izak Duenyas

    We study a multiperiod network revenue management problem where a seller sells multiple products made from multiple resources with finite capacity in an environment where the underlying demand function is a priori unknown (in the nonparametric sense). The objective of the seller is to simultaneously learn the unknown demand function and dynamically price the products to minimize the expected revenue loss. For the problem where the number of selling periods and initial capacity are scaled by [ ], it is known that the expected revenue loss of any non-anticipating pricing policy is [ ]. However, there is a considerable gap between this theoretical lower bound and the performance bound of the best-known heuristic control in the literature. In this paper, we propose a nonparametric self-adjusting control and show that its expected revenue loss is [ ] for any arbitrarily small [ ], provided that the underlying demand function is sufficiently smooth. This is the tightest bound of its kind for the problem setting that we consider in this paper, and it significantly improves the performance bound of existing heuristic controls in the literature. In addition, our intermediate results on the large deviation bounds for spline estimation and nonparametric stability analysis of constrained optimization are of independent interest and are potentially useful for other applications. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0937 .


  • When to Deploy Test Auctions in Sourcing

    by Damian R. Beil, Qi (George) Chen, Izak Duenyas, Brendan D. See

    We investigate when a buyer seeking to procure multiple units of an input may find it advantageous to run a “test auction” in which she has incumbent suppliers bid on a portion of the desired units. The test auction reveals incumbent supplier cost information that helps the buyer determine how many entrants (if any) to recruit at a cost prior to awarding the remaining units. The optimal number of entrant suppliers to recruit follows a threshold policy that is monotonic in the test auction’s clearing price unless the underlying supplier cost distribution is not regular. When setting her reserve price in the test auction, the buyer uses supplier recruitment as her “outside option”: if the reserve price is not met in the test auction, the buyer recruits new suppliers and runs a second auction. We compare the attractiveness of the test auction procedure relative to the more conventional procedure in which the buyer auctions off her entire demand in one auction. Since the buyer can choose ex ante which procedure to use, we propose using whichever has lower ex ante total (purchase plus recruitment) cost. Finally, using an optimal mechanism analysis, we find a lower bound on the buyer’s cost, and use that cost as a benchmark to show that our proposed sourcing strategy performs well given its ease of implementation. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0636 .