Turing and Free Will: A New Take on an Old Debate
Open Access
- 31 May 2017
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 305-321
Abstract
In 1948 Turing claimed that the concept of intelligence is an “emotional concept”. An emotional concept is a response-dependent concept and Turing’s remarks in his 1948 and 1952 papers suggest a response-dependence approach to the concept of intelligence. On this view, whether or not an object is intelligent is determined, as Turing said, “as much by our own state of mind and training as by the properties of the object”. His discussion of free will suggests a similar approach. Turing said, for example, that if a machine’s program “results in its doing something interesting which we had not anticipated I should be inclined to say that the machine had originated something”. This points to a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism and explore here.Keywords
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