Competing for power in multilateral negotiations under majority and unanimity rules
- 17 September 2026
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 160
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- Tamkeen (CG005)
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