CaSA: End-to-End Quantitative Security Analysis of Randomly Mapped Caches
- 18 June 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Design & Test
- Vol. 42 (1) , 5-12
Abstract
Editor’s notes: Many security issues have recently been discovered in modern processors, leading experts to rethink their design. Since the cache-a critical part of modern processors-is often targeted by hackers to steal information, this research explores how well one popular defense, randomly mapped caches, works in protecting against such attacks. —Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Texas A&M University, USAKeywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (CNS-2046359)
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-20-1-0402)
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