YYYuheng Yang

Yuheng Yang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Yuheng Yang has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Compass: Navigating the Design Space of Taint Schemes for RTL Security Verification

    by Yuheng Yang, Qinhan Tan, Thomas Bourgeat, Sharad Malik, Mengjia Yan

    Hardware information flow tracking (IFT) using taint analysis provides a methodology to check whether a hardware design satisfies certain security properties. Previous work has shown a broad trade-off space between precision and complexity when using different taint analysis schemes. A careful investigation of this space has led to the insight that applying different taint schemes to different components of a hardware design can improve overall efficiency. We present Compass, a systematic framework to guide users in designing appropriate taint schemes that are as lightweight as possible while still sufficient to accomplish their security verification goals. We first establish a unified terminology to comprehensively capture existing taint schemes. We then apply counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) for taint refinement to iteratively improve the taint scheme. We evaluated Compass on a set of open-source RISCV processors to verify the information flow properties for speculative execution vulnerabilities, and demonstrate that Compass significantly improves both simulation speed and formal-verification scalability of taint analysis.


  • Open Access

    RTL Verification for Secure Speculation Using Contract Shadow Logic

    by Qinhan Tan, Yuheng Yang, Thomas Bourgeat, Sharad Malik, Mengjia Yan

    Modern out-of-order processors face speculative execution attacks. Despite various proposed software and hardware mitigations to prevent such attacks, new attacks keep arising from unknown vulnerabilities. Thus, a formal and rigorous evaluation of the ability of hardware designs to deal with speculative execution attacks is urgently desired. This paper proposes a formal verification technique called Contract Shadow Logic that can considerably improve RTL verification scalability with little manual effort while being applicable to different defense mechanisms. In this technique, we leverage computer architecture design insights to improve verification performance for checking security properties formulated as software-hardware contracts for secure speculation. Our verification scheme is accessible to computer architects and requires minimal formal-method expertise. We evaluate our technique on multiple RTL designs, including three out-of-order processors. The experimental results demonstrate that our technique exhibits a significant advantage in finding attacks on insecure designs and deriving complete proofs on secure designs, when compared to the baseline and two state-of-the-art verification schemes, LEAVE and UPEC.


  • Open Access

    RTL Verification for Secure Speculation Using Contract Shadow Logic

    by Qinhan Tan, Yuheng Yang, Thomas Bourgeat, Sharad Malik, Mengjia Yan

    Modern out-of-order processors face speculative execution attacks. Despite various proposed software and hardware mitigations to prevent such attacks, new attacks keep arising from unknown vulnerabilities. Thus, a formal and rigorous evaluation of the ability of hardware designs to deal with speculative execution attacks is urgently desired. This paper proposes a formal verification technique called Contract Shadow Logic that can considerably improve RTL verification scalability while being applicable to different defense mechanisms. In this technique, we leverage computer architecture design insights to improve verification performance for checking security properties formulated as software-hardware contracts for secure speculation. Our verification scheme is accessible to computer architects and requires minimal formal-method expertise. We evaluate our technique on multiple RTL designs, including three out-of-order processors. The experimental results demonstrate that our technique exhibits a significant advantage in finding attacks on insecure designs and deriving complete proofs on secure designs, when compared to the baseline and two state-of-the-art verification schemes, LEAVE and UPEC.

  • Open Access

    SoK: Understanding Design Choices and Pitfalls of Trusted Execution Environments

    by Mengyuan Li, Yuheng Yang, Guoxing Chen, Mengjia Yan, Yinqian Zhang

    Trusted execution environment (TEE) is a revolutionary technology that enables secure remote execution (SRE) of cloud workloads on untrusted server-side computing platforms. Both commercial and academic TEEs have been proposed in the past few years, including Intel's SGX and TDX, AMD's SEV, ARM's CCA, IBM's PEF, and their academic counterparts built atop open-source RISC-V processors, such as Keystone, Sanctum, CURE, and Penglai. While great efforts from both sides have been made in developing a confidential computing ecosystem, the existence of server-side TEEs with drastically different designs and the presence of various known attacks have significantly increased the difficulty of understanding TEE designs and the reasons behind existing attacks. This paper offers a structured analysis of the design choices of server-side TEEs, focusing on dissecting TEE designs and identifying their potential pitfalls. We introduce the TEE Runtime Architectural Framework (TRAF), a detailed framework that facilitates a thorough and methodical dissection of TEE designs by analyzing the high-level considerations made by TEE designs. A key aspect of TRAF's analysis is the reconfiguration of resource management in TEE designs, where the host OS used to have full control. By incorporating the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), TEE designs adopt different design choices on how to divide and coordinate tasks between the host OS and TCB to achieve security and effective management of computational resources. TRAF specifically investigates how common resources, such as CPU, memory, and I/O devices, are managed jointly by the TCB and host OS. This includes a focused study of factors that influence design choices, such as TCB size, performance, and efficiency. Furthermore, by examining existing vulnerabilities and attacks on TEEs, the paper further evaluates the security impact of varied design choices.


  • CaSA: End-to-End Quantitative Security Analysis of Randomly Mapped Caches

    by Thomas Bourgeat, Jules Drean, Yuheng Yang, Lillian Tsai, Joel S. Emer, Mengjia Yan

    Editor’s notes: Many security issues have recently been discovered in modern processors, leading experts to rethink their design. Since the cache-a critical part of modern processors-is often targeted by hackers to steal information, this research explores how well one popular defense, randomly mapped caches, works in protecting against such attacks. —Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Texas A&M University, USA


  • Open Access

    DAGguise: mitigating memory timing side channels

    by Peter W. Deutsch, Yuheng Yang, Thomas Bourgeat, Jules Drean, Joel S. Emer, Mengjia Yan

    This paper studies the mitigation of memory timing side channels, where attackers utilize contention within DRAM controllers to infer a victim’s secrets. Already practical, this class of channels poses an important challenge to secure computing in shared memory environments. Existing state-of-the-art memory timing side channel mitigations have several key performance and security limitations. Prior schemes require onerous static bandwidth partitioning, extensive profiling phases, or simply fail to protect against attacks which exploit fine-grained timing and bank information. We present DAGguise, a defense mechanism which fully protects against memory timing side channels while allowing for dynamic traffic contention in order to achieve good performance. DAGguise utilizes a novel abstract memory access representation, the Directed Acyclic Request Graph (rDAG for short), to model memory access patterns which experience contention. DAGguise shapes a victim’s memory access patterns according to a publicly known rDAG obtained through a lightweight profiling stage, completely eliminating information leakage. We formally verify the security of DAGguise, proving that it maintains strong security guarantees. Moreover, by allowing dynamic traffic contention, DAGguise achieves a 12% overall system speedup relative to Fixed Service, which is the state-of-the-art mitigation mechanism, with up to a 20% relative speedup for co-located applications which do not require protection. We further claim that the principles of DAGguise can be generalized to protect against other types of scheduler-based timing side channels, such as those targeting on-chip networks, or functional units in SMT cores.