Two Concepts of Commitment
Author:
Open Access
- 19 January 2026
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- p. 1-21
Abstract
The term ‘commitment’ plays a central role in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of action, and social ontology. Despite its centrality, the meaning of this term is seldom made explicit. It is not always clear what different authors mean when they use the term. This lack of clarity is especially apparent when using phrases like ‘shared commitments’ or ‘mutual commitment’. I argue that the term ‘commitment’ is used in at least two ways, which I call “private commitments” and “public commitments”. These senses can be distinguished by their different types of normative product. I then explicate different notions of the term ‘shared commitment’ derived from the two main notions. Finally, I apply these distinctions to try to make sense of paradigmatic uses of the term in the literature.Keywords
This publication has 55 references indexed in Scilit:
- Tomasello on “we” and the sense of obligationBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 2020
- Knowledge requires commitment (instead of belief)Philosophical Studies, 2017
- What Good Is Commitment?Ethics, 2009
- Social Convention RevisitedTopoi, 2008
- Searle's Derivation of Promissory Obligation2007
- SYMPATHY, COMMITMENT, AND PREFERENCEEconomics and Philosophy, 2005
- WHY EXACTLY IS COMMITMENT IMPORTANT FOR RATIONALITY?Economics and Philosophy, 2005
- Expression and Meaning1979
- Speech Acts1969
- Notes on the Concept of CommitmentAmerican Journal of Sociology, 1960