The Regulatory-avoidance Theory of Innovation

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Abstract
Blockchain is a striking instance of rapid technological innovation that arises in conditions of alegality. This paper advances a novel explanation for this distinct type of innovation. It develops a biological analogy in which rapid mutation is understood as an adaptive response to intense selection pressure from predation. Regulation can inhibit innovation-indirectly or deliberately. Accordingly, this paper characterises regulation which classifies a technology as a specific type of product for rent extraction, or bans specific applications of a technology, as forms of predation. Standard innovation theory would predict that sustained regulatory hostility slows diffusion and deters investment. Blockchain exhibits the opposite pattern: it diversified rapidly across multiple niches precisely as regulatory pressure intensified and did so without innovation policy support. The paper argues that this trajectory is best understood as adaptive "escape": blockchain generated novel technological capabilities as a side-effect of avoiding regulatory constraint rather than as a response to consumer demand. Rapid shifts in application design, governance structures, and technical architecture are modelled as fitness-maximising strategies to evade predatory pressures. By analysing cases ranging from clandestine printing networks to shadow finance, the paper demonstrates that this adaptive mechanism is not specific to digital technology. It concludes by considering the predation theory's implications for innovation policy and discusses a future research agenda.