Aaron M. Lane
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Aaron M. Lane has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Darcy W. E. Allen
RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
8 shared publications - Chris Berg
RMIT University
7 shared publications - Jason Potts
RMIT University
6 shared publications Julian Waters-Lynch
2 shared publicationsPatrick A. McLaughlin
Mercatus Centre at George Mason University Arlington Virginia
2 shared publicationsPrimavera De Filippi
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Regulatory-Avoidance Theory of Innovation
Blockchain is a striking instance of rapid technological innovation that arises in conditions of alegality. This paper advances a novel explanation for this distinct type of innovation. It develops a biological analogy in which rapid mutation is understood as an adaptive response to intense selection pressure from predation. Regulation can inhibit innovation-indirectly or deliberately. Accordingly, this paper characterises regulation which classifies a technology as a specific type of product for rent extraction, or bans specific applications of a technology, as forms of predation. Standard innovation theory would predict that sustained regulatory hostility slows diffusion and deters investment. Blockchain exhibits the opposite pattern: it diversified rapidly across multiple niches precisely as regulatory pressure intensified and did so without innovation policy support. The paper argues that this trajectory is best understood as adaptive "escape": blockchain generated novel technological capabilities as a side-effect of avoiding regulatory constraint rather than as a response to consumer demand. Rapid shifts in application design, governance structures, and technical architecture are modelled as fitness-maximising strategies to evade predatory pressures. By analysing cases ranging from clandestine printing networks to shadow finance, the paper demonstrates that this adaptive mechanism is not specific to digital technology. It concludes by considering the predation theory's implications for innovation policy and discusses a future research agenda.
- 13 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Regulatory-Avoidance Theory of Innovation
Blockchain is a striking instance of rapid technological innovation that arises in conditions of alegality. This paper advances a novel explanation for this distinct type of innovation. It develops a biological analogy in which rapid mutation is understood as an adaptive response to intense selection pressure from predation. Regulation can inhibit innovation-indirectly or deliberately. Accordingly, this paper characterises regulation which classifies a technology as a specific type of product for rent extraction, or bans specific applications of a technology, as forms of predation. Standard innovation theory would predict that sustained regulatory hostility slows diffusion and deters investment. Blockchain exhibits the opposite pattern: it diversified rapidly across multiple niches precisely as regulatory pressure intensified and did so without innovation policy support. The paper argues that this trajectory is best understood as adaptive "escape": blockchain generated novel technological capabilities as a side-effect of avoiding regulatory constraint rather than as a response to consumer demand. Rapid shifts in application design, governance structures, and technical architecture are modelled as fitness-maximising strategies to evade predatory pressures. By analysing cases ranging from clandestine printing networks to shadow finance, the paper demonstrates that this adaptive mechanism is not specific to digital technology. It concludes by considering the predation theory's implications for innovation policy and discusses a future research agenda.
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Regulatory-avoidance Theory of Innovation
Blockchain is a striking instance of rapid technological innovation that arises in conditions of alegality. This paper advances a novel explanation for this distinct type of innovation. It develops a biological analogy in which rapid mutation is understood as an adaptive response to intense selection pressure from predation. Regulation can inhibit innovation-indirectly or deliberately. Accordingly, this paper characterises regulation which classifies a technology as a specific type of product for rent extraction, or bans specific applications of a technology, as forms of predation. Standard innovation theory would predict that sustained regulatory hostility slows diffusion and deters investment. Blockchain exhibits the opposite pattern: it diversified rapidly across multiple niches precisely as regulatory pressure intensified and did so without innovation policy support. The paper argues that this trajectory is best understood as adaptive "escape": blockchain generated novel technological capabilities as a side-effect of avoiding regulatory constraint rather than as a response to consumer demand. Rapid shifts in application design, governance structures, and technical architecture are modelled as fitness-maximising strategies to evade predatory pressures. By analysing cases ranging from clandestine printing networks to shadow finance, the paper demonstrates that this adaptive mechanism is not specific to digital technology. It concludes by considering the predation theory's implications for innovation policy and discusses a future research agenda.
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Regulatory-avoidance Theory of Innovation
Blockchain is a striking instance of rapid technological innovation that arises in conditions of alegality. This paper advances a novel explanation for this distinct type of innovation. It develops a biological analogy in which rapid mutation is understood as an adaptive response to intense selection pressure from predation. Regulation can inhibit innovation-indirectly or deliberately. Accordingly, this paper characterises regulation which classifies a technology as a specific type of product for rent extraction, or bans specific applications of a technology, as forms of predation. Standard innovation theory would predict that sustained regulatory hostility slows diffusion and deters investment. Blockchain exhibits the opposite pattern: it diversified rapidly across multiple niches precisely as regulatory pressure intensified and did so without innovation policy support. The paper argues that this trajectory is best understood as adaptive "escape": blockchain generated novel technological capabilities as a side-effect of avoiding regulatory constraint rather than as a response to consumer demand. Rapid shifts in application design, governance structures, and technical architecture are modelled as fitness-maximising strategies to evade predatory pressures. By analysing cases ranging from clandestine printing networks to shadow finance, the paper demonstrates that this adaptive mechanism is not specific to digital technology. It concludes by considering the predation theory's implications for innovation policy and discusses a future research agenda.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Cryptoeconomy as a Concentrated Growth Culture
This chapter argues that crypto is not merely a technological or financial innovation, but the most concentrated culture of institutional improvement since the Enlightenment. Drawing on Nobel Laureate Joel Mokyr's body of work, we frame the cryptoeconomy as a community that legitimises experimentation, rewards useful knowledge, and sustains belief in progress. Rather than treating growth as the product of incentives or formal institutions alone, Mokyr emphasised the cultural norms and intellectual networks that protect novelty and enable cumulative improvement. The cryptoeconomy's open knowledge communities, composable institutional toolkits, and embedded incentive structures are a public global laboratory for institutional evolution. This chapter argues that Mokyr's cultural framework is a useful lens for understanding crypto as a sustained experiment in building new institutions rather than reforming old ones.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Cryptoeconomy as a Concentrated Growth Culture
This chapter argues that crypto is not merely a technological or financial innovation, but the most concentrated culture of institutional improvement since the Enlightenment. Drawing on Nobel Laureate Joel Mokyr's body of work, we frame the cryptoeconomy as a community that legitimises experimentation, rewards useful knowledge, and sustains belief in progress. Rather than treating growth as the product of incentives or formal institutions alone, Mokyr emphasised the cultural norms and intellectual networks that protect novelty and enable cumulative improvement. The cryptoeconomy's open knowledge communities, composable institutional toolkits, and embedded incentive structures are a public global laboratory for institutional evolution. This chapter argues that Mokyr's cultural framework is a useful lens for understanding crypto as a sustained experiment in building new institutions rather than reforming old ones.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Private Law Remedies for Cryptocurrency Fraud
This chapter provides an analysis of legal mechanisms to addressing fraud and scams involving cryptocurrency, drawing on both practical legal experience and the new comparative economics. Although illicit transactions account for a small portion of total cryptocurrency transaction volumes, individuals incur significant private losses and there are unique enforcement challenges in the Web3 ecosystem. The prevalent legal approach to addressing cryptocurrency-based fraud is though public enforcement mechanisms. This chapter argues that in some circumstances private law and civil litigation mechanisms can offer a more efficient mechanism for addressing cryptocurrency-based fraud with tools to identify perpetrators, tailored legal claims, and secure assets. The chapter concludes by making recommendations to enhance these private law remedies.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPrivate Law Remedies for Cryptocurrency Fraud
This chapter provides an analysis of legal mechanisms to addressing fraud and scams involving cryptocurrency, drawing on both practical legal experience and the new comparative economics. Although illicit transactions account for a small portion of total cryptocurrency transaction volumes, individuals incur significant private losses and there are unique enforcement challenges in the Web3 ecosystem. The prevalent legal approach to addressing cryptocurrency-based fraud is though public enforcement mechanisms. This chapter argues that in some circumstances private law and civil litigation mechanisms can offer a more efficient mechanism for addressing cryptocurrency-based fraud with tools to identify perpetrators, tailored legal claims, and secure assets. The chapter concludes by making recommendations to enhance these private law remedies.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 193-214
Private Law Remedies for Cryptocurrency Fraud
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Submission to the Strategic Examination of R&D discussion paper
This submission to Australia’s strategic examination of Research and Development (R&D) discussion paper argues that Australia's innovation failures are due to a flawed and outdated understanding of how innovation works. Research is not innovation. Innovation happens in markets and commons, driven by entrepreneurs experimenting with new ideas, not by producing more academic research. We critique the industrial-era assumptions in the inquiry’s discussion paper and propose a new framework based on the theory of the innovation commons. Policy should focus on removing barriers to experimentation and supporting new institutions that enable bottom-up innovation.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSubmission to the Strategic Examination of R&D discussion paper
This submission to Australia’s strategic examination of Research and Development (R&D) discussion paper argues that Australia's innovation failures are due to a flawed and outdated understanding of how innovation works. Research is not innovation. Innovation happens in markets and commons, driven by entrepreneurs experimenting with new ideas, not by producing more academic research. We critique the industrial-era assumptions in the inquiry’s discussion paper and propose a new framework based on the theory of the innovation commons. Policy should focus on removing barriers to experimentation and supporting new institutions that enable bottom-up innovation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Dynamic Competition and Digital Platforms
Submission to the Australian Treasury Consultation on a New Digital Competition Regime The Australian Treasury’s proposed competition regime for digital platforms is flawed and should not proceed. The policy rationale for an ex ante regime is unjustified. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) already provides a comprehensive framework to address concerns such as market power, unfair contract terms, and self-preferencing. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has not demonstrated any compelling reason existing competition laws are insufficient to regulate digital platforms and has not sought to enforce them against digital platforms. The proposed regime is based on a misunderstanding of competition in the digital economy. Digital markets are characterised by dynamic competition, where innovation and technological change are the primary drivers of consumer welfare. The proposed ex ante regime, with its focus on static competition, may dampen innovation incentives and create barriers to technology diffusion, harming Australian consumers and businesses in the long run. Competition policy for digital platforms should be based on a dynamic competition approach that fosters innovation.The proposed regulatory mechanisms are problematic. The reliance on subordinate legislation for crucial policy decisions is inappropriate, reducing parliamentary oversight. This approach lacks transparency and accountability, and may lead to unintended consequences for the digital economy. We urge the Australian Treasury to reconsider its approach to regulating digital platforms. Instead of imposing an ex ante regime, the focus should be on enforcing existing competition laws and fostering a dynamic environment of innovation. This approach would better serve Australia’s long-term economic interests and the continued growth of the digital sector.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDynamic Competition and Digital Platforms
Submission to the Australian Treasury Consultation on a New Digital Competition Regime The Australian Treasury’s proposed competition regime for digital platforms is flawed and should not proceed. The policy rationale for an ex ante regime is unjustified. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) already provides a comprehensive framework to address concerns such as market power, unfair contract terms, and self-preferencing. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has not demonstrated any compelling reason existing competition laws are insufficient to regulate digital platforms and has not sought to enforce them against digital platforms. The proposed regime is based on a misunderstanding of competition in the digital economy. Digital markets are characterised by dynamic competition, where innovation and technological change are the primary drivers of consumer welfare. The proposed ex ante regime, with its focus on static competition, may dampen innovation incentives and create barriers to technology diffusion, harming Australian consumers and businesses in the long run. Competition policy for digital platforms should be based on a dynamic competition approach that fosters innovation.The proposed regulatory mechanisms are problematic. The reliance on subordinate legislation for crucial policy decisions is inappropriate, reducing parliamentary oversight. This approach lacks transparency and accountability, and may lead to unintended consequences for the digital economy. We urge the Australian Treasury to reconsider its approach to regulating digital platforms. Instead of imposing an ex ante regime, the focus should be on enforcing existing competition laws and fostering a dynamic environment of innovation. This approach would better serve Australia’s long-term economic interests and the continued growth of the digital sector.
- 16 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Public Administration
- Vol. 80 (1) , 114-137
The political economy of Australian regulatory reform
The problem of regulatory accumulation has increasingly been recognised as a policy problem in its own right. Governments have then devised and implemented regulatory reform policies that directly seek to ameliorate the burdens of regulatory accumulation (e.g. red tape reduction targets). In this paper we examine regulatory reform approaches in Australia through the lens of policy innovation. Our contributions are twofold. We first examine the evolutionary discovery process of regulatory reform policies in Australia (at the federal, intergovernmental, and state levels). This demonstrates a process of policy innovation in regulatory mechanisms and measurements. We then analyse a new measurement of regulatory burden based on text analytics, RegData: Australia. RegData: Australia uses textual analysis to count ‘restrictiveness clauses' in regulation – such as ‘must’, ‘cannot’ and ‘shall’ – thereby developing a new database (RDAU1.0). We place this ‘restrictiveness clauses’ measurement within the context of regulatory policy innovation, and examine the potential for further innovation in regulatory reform mechanisms.
- 16 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Public Administration
- Vol. 80 (1) , 114-137
The political economy of Australian regulatory reform
The problem of regulatory accumulation has increasingly been recognised as a policy problem in its own right. Governments have then devised and implemented regulatory reform policies that directly seek to ameliorate the burdens of regulatory accumulation (e.g. red tape reduction targets). In this paper we examine regulatory reform approaches in Australia through the lens of policy innovation. Our contributions are twofold. We first examine the evolutionary discovery process of regulatory reform policies in Australia (at the federal, intergovernmental, and state levels). This demonstrates a process of policy innovation in regulatory mechanisms and measurements. We then analyse a new measurement of regulatory burden based on text analytics, RegData: Australia. RegData: Australia uses textual analysis to count ‘restrictiveness clauses' in regulation – such as ‘must’, ‘cannot’ and ‘shall’ – thereby developing a new database (RDAU1.0). We place this ‘restrictiveness clauses’ measurement within the context of regulatory policy innovation, and examine the potential for further innovation in regulatory reform mechanisms.
- Open Access
- 28 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Political Economy of Australian Regulatory Reform
The problem of regulatory accumulation has increasingly been recognized as a policy problem in its own right. Governments have then devised and implemented regulatory reform policies that directly seek to ameliorate the burdens of regulatory accumulation (e.g. red tape reduction targets). In this paper we examine regulatory reform approaches in Australia through the lens of policy innovation. Our contributions are twofold. We first examine the evolutionary discovery process of regulatory reform policies in Australia (at the federal, intergovernmental and state levels). This demonstrates a process of policy innovation in regulatory mechanisms and measurements. We then analyse a new measurement of regulatory burden based on text analytics, RegData: Australia (see Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017; McLaughlin et al 2019). RegData: Australia uses textual analysis to count “restrictiveness clauses” in regulation — such as “must”, “cannot” and “shall” — thereby developing a new database (RDAU1.0). We place this “restrictiveness clauses” measurement within the context of regulatory policy innovation, and examine the potential for further innovation in regulatory reform mechanisms.
- 28 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Political Economy of Australian Regulatory Reform
The problem of regulatory accumulation has increasingly been recognized as a policy problem in its own right. Governments have then devised and implemented regulatory reform policies that directly seek to ameliorate the burdens of regulatory accumulation (e.g. red tape reduction targets). In this paper we examine regulatory reform approaches in Australia through the lens of policy innovation. Our contributions are twofold. We first examine the evolutionary discovery process of regulatory reform policies in Australia (at the federal, intergovernmental and state levels). This demonstrates a process of policy innovation in regulatory mechanisms and measurements. We then analyse a new measurement of regulatory burden based on text analytics, RegData: Australia (see Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017; McLaughlin et al 2019). RegData: Australia uses textual analysis to count “restrictiveness clauses” in regulation — such as “must”, “cannot” and “shall” — thereby developing a new database (RDAU1.0). We place this “restrictiveness clauses” measurement within the context of regulatory policy innovation, and examine the potential for further innovation in regulatory reform mechanisms.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Problem of ‘Freezing’ An Economy in a Pandemic
The 2020 global pandemic abruptly brought into question many of our social, economic and political institutions. COVID-19 is more than a public health crisis—as economies and states falter there are deep questions about the resilience and robustness of our political and economic systems. Are we too reliant on global supply chains? If regulations don’t make sense in a crisis, do they make sense afterwards? Today we are presented the opportunity to rebuild the institutions and organisations of our modern economy. If we do this right, through a process of entrepreneurial discovery and bottom-up solutions, then we will emerge with a political-economic system that acts as an engine for prosperity, and one that is more resilient and robust to future shocks. In this book we tackle those questions and fill some of the current void of ideas and thinking about economic and political recovery. We develop a framework and principles for an institutional re-build, presenting a path to recovery based on the ideas of private governance, permissionless innovation and entrepreneurial dynamism.
- 10 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Problem of ‘Freezing’ An Economy in a Pandemic
The 2020 global pandemic abruptly brought into question many of our social, economic and political institutions. COVID-19 is more than a public health crisis—as economies and states falter there are deep questions about the resilience and robustness of our political and economic systems. Are we too reliant on global supply chains? If regulations don’t make sense in a crisis, do they make sense afterwards? Today we are presented the opportunity to rebuild the institutions and organisations of our modern economy. If we do this right, through a process of entrepreneurial discovery and bottom-up solutions, then we will emerge with a political-economic system that acts as an engine for prosperity, and one that is more resilient and robust to future shocks. In this book we tackle those questions and fill some of the current void of ideas and thinking about economic and political recovery. We develop a framework and principles for an institutional re-build, presenting a path to recovery based on the ideas of private governance, permissionless innovation and entrepreneurial dynamism.