Credence goods, experts and risk aversion
Authors:
- Olivier BonroyOBOlivier Bonroy
- Stéphane LemariéSLStéphane Lemarié
- Jean-Philippe TropéanoJTJean-Philippe Tropéano
- 1 September 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 120 (3) , 464-467
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- French National Research Agency
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and CompetitionAmerican Economic Review, 2011
- Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goodsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009
- On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence GoodsJournal of Economic Literature, 2006
- Credence Goods and Fraudulent ExpertsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1997
- Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of FraudThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1973