Olivier Bonroy
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Olivier Bonroy has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emanuele Bacchiega
Department of Computer Science and Engineering , University of Bologna , Bologna , Italy
5 shared publications Christos Constantatos
Christos Constantatos is a professor in the Department of Economics University of Macédonia Thessaloniki
3 shared publicationsAlexis Garapin
2 shared publications- Alexis Garapin
Université Grenoble Alpes, INRAE, UMR GAEL, Grenoble, France
2 shared publications - Jean-Philippe Gervais
Canada Research Chair in Agri-industries and International Trade, Department of Agricultural Economics and Consumer Studies and CRÉA, 2425 Rue de l'agriculture, Room 4415, Laval University, Quebec City, QC, Canada, G1K 7P4: phone: +418-656-2131, ext. 2122; fax: +418-656-7821;
2 shared publications - Nicolas Pasquier
Bordeaux School of Economics, University of Bordeaux, Pessac, France
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 247
Two-part tariff, demand uncertainty and double marginalization: An experiment
- 11 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 247
Open AccessTwo-part tariff, demand uncertainty and double marginalization: An experiment
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1175-1207
Patent Clearinghouse and Technology Diffusion: What is the Contribution of Arbitration Agreements?
One of the acknowledged advantages of patent clearinghouses is that they favor the diffusion of technology. In traditional clearinghouses, patents are usually bundled in pools and sold at a pre-set price. Recently, in the biotechnology industry a new form of clearinghouse has been observed, where patent tariffs are instead bargained over by the clearinghouse members. Exchange is then guaranteed by arbitration agreements to which the negotiating parties are bound, should their bargaining reach a dead end. This paper assesses the effect on technology diffusion of this new type of clearinghouse. We show that such arbitration agreements, through their effect on the outside options, may reduce the incentives of a member of the clearinghouse to license to non-members. This result highlights the role of such arbitration agreements in the diffusion of technology outside the clearinghouse.
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1175-1207
Patent Clearinghouse and Technology Diffusion: What is the Contribution of Arbitration Agreements?
One of the acknowledged advantages of patent clearinghouses is that they favor the diffusion of technology. In traditional clearinghouses, patents are usually bundled in pools and sold at a pre-set price. Recently, in the biotechnology industry a new form of clearinghouse has been observed, where patent tariffs are instead bargained over by the clearinghouse members. Exchange is then guaranteed by arbitration agreements to which the negotiating parties are bound, should their bargaining reach a dead end. This paper assesses the effect on technology diffusion of this new type of clearinghouse. We show that such arbitration agreements, through their effect on the outside options, may reduce the incentives of a member of the clearinghouse to license to non-members. This result highlights the role of such arbitration agreements in the diffusion of technology outside the clearinghouse.
- 9 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 93 (4) , 585-614
Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
- 9 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 93 (4) , 585-614
Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
- 25 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in SN Business & Economics
- Vol. 1 (11) , 1-7
Secret contracting and Nash-in-Nash bargaining
- 25 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in SN Business & Economics
- Vol. 1 (11) , 1-7
Secret contracting and Nash-in-Nash bargaining
- 29 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 101 (1) , 89-108
Free‐riding on Product Quality in Cooperatives: Lessons from an Experiment
An important issue facing marketing cooperatives is that the overall quality of the product depends on the quality of farm products provided by individual members. We conduct an experiment to empirically investigate producer incentives to free‐ride on quality among the members of a marketing cooperative in a setting where the average quality provided by cooperative members results in a collective rent that is distributed back to members in a patronage dividend levied in proportion to the quantity produced. Hidden actions by cooperative members that impact quality are imperfectly monitored, but free‐riding, when detected, results in exclusion from cooperative returns. The randomized payoff structure of our game results in a novel experimental design that nests public good games and multi‐player assurance games. Our findings indicate that free‐riding on product quality is deterred when (a) cooperatives base patronage dividends on quality outcomes of smaller groups; (b) payoffs from free‐riding are randomized by the possibility of exclusion from cooperative returns; and (c) cooperatives distribute a larger share of returns to members through indirect payments such as capital pooling and cost‐sharing arrangements unrelated to product quality.
- 29 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 101 (1) , 89-108
Free‐riding on Product Quality in Cooperatives: Lessons from an Experiment
An important issue facing marketing cooperatives is that the overall quality of the product depends on the quality of farm products provided by individual members. We conduct an experiment to empirically investigate producer incentives to free‐ride on quality among the members of a marketing cooperative in a setting where the average quality provided by cooperative members results in a collective rent that is distributed back to members in a patronage dividend levied in proportion to the quantity produced. Hidden actions by cooperative members that impact quality are imperfectly monitored, but free‐riding, when detected, results in exclusion from cooperative returns. The randomized payoff structure of our game results in a novel experimental design that nests public good games and multi‐player assurance games. Our findings indicate that free‐riding on product quality is deterred when (a) cooperatives base patronage dividends on quality outcomes of smaller groups; (b) payoffs from free‐riding are randomized by the possibility of exclusion from cooperative returns; and (c) cooperatives distribute a larger share of returns to members through indirect payments such as capital pooling and cost‐sharing arrangements unrelated to product quality.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 772-791
Contract contingency in vertically related markets
Over the last years, courts are increasingly inclined to consider precontractual arrangements as binding contracts, endowing them with commitment value that can be used strategically by the party that proposes them. We study the optimal precontractual arrangement offers of an upstream monopolist producing an essential input that may sell to two vertically differentiated downstream firms. These arrangements concern the exclusivity and the contingency of the contracts to be signed. Once the precontractual arrangements have been determined, the terms of the contracts are negotiated between the upstream supplier and the downstream firm(s). The distribution of bargaining power during the contract terms negotiations is the main driving force of the monopolist's choices. A powerful supplier always opts for an exclusive contract. By contrast, a weaker supplier offers nonexclusive contracts and makes each of them contingent or noncontingent such as to guarantee the most favorable outside option in its negotiations.
- 14 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 772-791
Open AccessContract contingency in vertically related markets
Over the last years, courts are increasingly inclined to consider precontractual arrangements as binding contracts, endowing them with commitment value that can be used strategically by the party that proposes them. We study the optimal precontractual arrangement offers of an upstream monopolist producing an essential input that may sell to two vertically differentiated downstream firms. These arrangements concern the exclusivity and the contingency of the contracts to be signed. Once the precontractual arrangements have been determined, the terms of the contracts are negotiated between the upstream supplier and the downstream firm(s). The distribution of bargaining power during the contract terms negotiations is the main driving force of the monopolist's choices. A powerful supplier always opts for an exclusive contract. By contrast, a weaker supplier offers nonexclusive contracts and makes each of them contingent or noncontingent such as to guarantee the most favorable outside option in its negotiations.
- 13 October 2017
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 50 (4) , 1037-1062
Eco‐labelling by a for‐profit certifier: Countervailing power and its consequences
For‐profit certifier's eco‐labelling is common in industries where firms have some “countervailing power” on sharing gains from labelling. We show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong “power.” A certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain. This switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard. This is consequential for evaluating policies. The dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used, and ultimately upon firms’ countervailing power.
- 13 October 2017
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 50 (4) , 1037-1062
Eco‐labelling by a for‐profit certifier: Countervailing power and its consequences
For‐profit certifier's eco‐labelling is common in industries where firms have some “countervailing power” on sharing gains from labelling. We show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong “power.” A certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain. This switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard. This is consequential for evaluating policies. The dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used, and ultimately upon firms’ countervailing power.
- 2 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 13 (2) , 197-216
Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence
This paper considers the effects that the opportunity to change partners has on communication. Our experiment concerns a standard cheap talk game in which a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he sends to his partner. Two treatments are applied: in one, each team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and in the other, players can change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners positively affects communication in the relationship. Interestingly, this effect is explained by higher levels of trust in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure of private information.
- 2 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 13 (2) , 197-216
Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence
This paper considers the effects that the opportunity to change partners has on communication. Our experiment concerns a standard cheap talk game in which a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he sends to his partner. Two treatments are applied: in one, each team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and in the other, players can change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners positively affects communication in the relationship. Interestingly, this effect is explained by higher levels of trust in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure of private information.
- Open Access
- 11 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 67 (3) , 846-863
On the benefits of contractual inefficiency in quality-differentiated markets
Contractual inefficiencies within supply chains increase an input price above its marginal cost, therefore they are considered detrimental to consumer surplus. We argue that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to consumers in quality-differentiated markets. Indeed, enhancing contractual efficiency in high-quality supply chains may adversely affect the market structure by driving low-quality vertical chains out of the market and consequently reduce consumer surplus. Due to the finiteness property, (counter-)integration in the low-quality channel does not allow this channel to be in business. Our result holds irrespective of whether the contractual inefficiencies originate from the double marginalization or the ‘commitment effect’.
- 11 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 67 (3) , 846-863
Open AccessOn the benefits of contractual inefficiency in quality-differentiated markets
Contractual inefficiencies within supply chains increase an input price above its marginal cost, therefore they are considered detrimental to consumer surplus. We argue that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to consumers in quality-differentiated markets. Indeed, enhancing contractual efficiency in high-quality supply chains may adversely affect the market structure by driving low-quality vertical chains out of the market and consequently reduce consumer surplus. Due to the finiteness property, (counter-)integration in the low-quality channel does not allow this channel to be in business. Our result holds irrespective of whether the contractual inefficiencies originate from the double marginalization or the ‘commitment effect’.
- 24 September 2014
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 97 (1) , 239-259
On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants
Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? The answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information, yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants. This essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side‐effects. In contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way, we bring together the main results from all the relevant topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and model‐building techniques that underpin them. The advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results, thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory. We focus on “quality labels” and examine the impact of labeling on market structure, the side‐effects of costly certification, issues related to the label's trustworthiness, the rationale for mandatory vs. voluntary labeling, the level at which the label's standard is set according to the agency that selects it, the political economy of labels, that is, pro‐ or anti‐label lobbying, lobbying to affect the label's standard, and lobbying in favor or against the label's mandatory imposition. These topics cover a wide range of applications, including Genetically Modified Organism (GMOs), organic produce, geographic indicators, controlled origin, eco‐labels, etc. We conclude by identifying topics that require further research.
- 24 September 2014
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 97 (1) , 239-259
On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants
Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? The answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information, yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants. This essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side‐effects. In contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way, we bring together the main results from all the relevant topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and model‐building techniques that underpin them. The advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results, thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory. We focus on “quality labels” and examine the impact of labeling on market structure, the side‐effects of costly certification, issues related to the label's trustworthiness, the rationale for mandatory vs. voluntary labeling, the level at which the label's standard is set according to the agency that selects it, the political economy of labels, that is, pro‐ or anti‐label lobbying, lobbying to affect the label's standard, and lobbying in favor or against the label's mandatory imposition. These topics cover a wide range of applications, including Genetically Modified Organism (GMOs), organic produce, geographic indicators, controlled origin, eco‐labels, etc. We conclude by identifying topics that require further research.