Thinking outside the (Ballot) Box: Informal Electoral Institutions and Mexico's Political Opening
Author:
- Todd A. EisenstadtTETodd A. Eisenstadt
- 1 January 2003
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Latin American Politics and Society
- Vol. 45 (1) , 25-54
Abstract
This article studies the development of informal bargaining tables to mitigate postelectoral conflicts in some 15 percent of Mexico's local elections between 1989 and 2000, even as formally autonomous electoral commissions and courts were being constituted. By documenting the dual institutions that resulted, the study qualifies theories of institutional design that take actor consent for granted. It argues that in the Mexican case and perhaps others, elections, particularly subnational elections, are focal points for informal bargaining over rules that are the true motors of protracted transitions. It finds electoral institutions to be critical to democratization, but for reasons beyond those given by most institutionalists.Keywords
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- “Seek and Ye Shall Find!”Comparative Political Studies, 2001
- Democratization and Institutional Change in MexicoComparative Political Studies, 2001
- Parchment, Equilibria, and InstitutionsComparative Political Studies, 2000
- Institutionalizing Democracy: Constraint and Ambition in the Politics of Electoral ReformComparative Politics, 2000
- After the Break-upComparative Political Studies, 2000
- Electoral Juggling: A Comparative History of the Corruption of Suffrage in Latin America, 1830–1930Journal of Latin American Studies, 2000
- The role of electoral administration in democratic transitions: Implications for policy and researchDemocratization, 1999
- What Went Wrong in Russia? The Perils of a Protracted TransitionJournal of Democracy, 1999
- The Structural Determinants of Democratic ConsolidationComparative Political Studies, 1998
- Inestabilidad politica y presidencialismo en MexicoMexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 1994