TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND RULES
Open Access
- 24 October 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 56 (3) , 1526-1542
Abstract
Many economic interactions rely on trust and trust violations can have serious economic consequences. Simple minimum standard rules are attractive because they prevent egregious trust violations. However, they may undermine more trusting and reciprocal (trustworthy) behavior that otherwise would have occurred, leading to worse outcomes. In an experimental trust game, we test the efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum standard rules. Rules damage trust and reciprocity, reducing economic welfare. While sufficiently restrictive rules restore welfare, trust and reciprocity never return. Results indicate that participants are concerned about payoffs while also using the game to learn about trust and trustworthiness of others. (JEL C72, C90, D63, D64, L51)Keywords
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Funding Information
- Economic Science Institute Internal Research Funds
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