TSTimothy W. Shields

Timothy W. Shields

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Timothy W. Shields has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Better-than-chance prediction of cooperative behaviour from first and second impressions

    by Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields

    Could cooperation among strangers be facilitated by adaptations that use sparse information to accurately predict cooperative behaviour? We hypothesise that predictions are influenced by beliefs, descriptions, appearance and behavioural history available for first and second impressions. We also hypothesise that predictions improve when more information is available. We conducted a two-part study. First, we recorded thin-slice videos of university students just before their choices in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with matched partners. Second, a worldwide sample of raters evaluated each player using videos, photos, only gender labels or neither images nor labels. Raters guessed players’ first-round Prisoner's Dilemma choices and then their second-round choices after reviewing first-round behavioural histories. Our design allows us to investigate incremental effects of gender, appearance and behavioural history gleaned during first and second impressions. Predictions become more accurate and better-than-chance when gender, appearance or behavioural history is added. However, these effects are not incrementally cumulative. Predictions from treatments showing player appearance were no more accurate than those from treatments revealing gender labels and predictions from videos were no more accurate than those from photos. These results demonstrate how people accurately predict cooperation under sparse information conditions, helping explain why conditional cooperation is common among strangers.


  • Open Access

    The Conservatism Principle and Asymmetric Preferences over Reporting Errors

    by Jivas Chakravarthy, Timothy W. Shields

    Accounting conservatism has been described as deriving from preferences for reporting errors to be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement. We pair reporters with users (who rely on reporters’ information) in a multiperiod experiment. We posit that, under misaligned incentives that motivate aggressive reporting, users view aggressive reports as reflecting exploitative intent and expect that a norm prohibiting aggressive reporting applies. We predict that users use noisy reporting errors to gauge reporters’ norm compliance. We find that, ceteris paribus, users prefer not to be paired with reporters producing overstatement errors likely to reflect aggressive reporting relative to reporters producing understatement errors likely to reflect conservative reporting; alternatively, we find no such asymmetric preferences when the agents’ motives are aligned. The asymmetric preferences cannot be explained by agency theory predictions of payoff maximization or loss aversion. These moral preferences provide an initial condition from which conservatism can endogenously emerge. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: B52; D81; D82; M41.


  • Financial reporting and moral sentiments

    by Radhika Lunawat, Timothy W. Shields, Gregory Waymire


  • INVESTMENT CHOICE ARCHITECTURE IN TRUST GAMES: WHEN “ALL‐IN” IS NOT ENOUGH

    by Joaquín Gómez‐Miñambres, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields

    While many economic interactions feature “All‐or‐Nothing” options nudging investors towards going “all‐in,” such designs may unintentionally affect reciprocity. We manipulate the investor's action space in two versions of the “trust game.” In one version investors can invest either “all” their endowment or “nothing.” In the other version, they can invest any amount of the endowment. Consistent with our intentions‐based model, we show that “all‐or‐nothing” designs coax more investment but limit investors' demonstrability of intended trust. As a result, “all‐in” investors are less generously reciprocated than when they can invest any amount, where full investments are a clearer signal of trustworthiness.(JELC72, C90, C91, D63, D64, L51)


  • Open Access

    Accounting Conservatism as a Social Norm

    by Jivas Chakravarthy, Timothy W. Shields

    We conduct an experiment which pairs senders (providers of information) and receivers (users of information) in a setting characterized by information asymmetry, measurement uncertainty, and misaligned incentives that motivate senders to report aggressively. Each period receivers evaluate reporting errors and rank each sender in order of preference, which determines the next period’s pairings. We posit that receivers perceive a social norm to apply – an informal rule prohibiting aggressive reporting – and use noisy reporting errors to gauge senders’ compliance. Consistent with this expectation we find that, ceteris paribus, receivers disprefer senders producing: (i) a large overstatement error than understatement error of equal magnitude and (ii) an incremental overstatement error than incremental understatement error. These asymmetric revealed preferences are both inconsistent with strategic self-interested behavior and cannot be explained by loss aversion. Alternatively, when senders’ motives are aligned with receivers’, we find no asymmetry in receivers’ revealed preferences over reporting errors. While our evidence is indirect, our findings open the possibility that accounting conservatism emerged as a social norm – an informal bonding cost, borne by the sender – that serves to enhance trust and cooperation among economic agents. We believe this insight can open new possibilities for conservatism research.

  • Open Access

    Financial Reporting and Moral Sentiments

    by Radhika Lunawat, Timothy W. Shields, Gregory B. Waymire

    Adam Smith posits in Theory of Moral Sentiments that we self-regulate our conduct in anticipation of others’ moral judgments. The mechanism is an “Impartial Spectator,” a fictitious individual constructed in the mind who helps us predict whether our actions will earn others’ approval or disapproval. We hypothesize that financial reporting activates this mechanism and leads managers to make investment and resource sharing decisions that are better aligned with investor interests. We test this hypothesis with an experiment where we manipulate the availability of a financial report that reveals the manager’s reinvestment and self-compensation to the investor. Our evidence shows that financial reporting better aligns a manager’s reinvestment and resource sharing actions with investor interests even though the investor can impose no cost or confer no reward on the manager. This effect is robust to equalizing the relative power of the two individuals by giving the investor the right to terminate the game at any point and take a sizable portion of the assets. Our evidence is important because it suggests that at least part of financial reporting’s economic value derives from implicating human moral judgments in addition to its traditional contracting or valuation functions.

  • Open Access

    Trust in Humans, Robots, and Cyborgs: Treated the Same, but Experienced Differently

    by Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields, Daniel Sznycer

    Human-robot and human-cyborg interactions requiring trust are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on the road, and in the home, yet little is known about human willingness to make trust-based investments with non-human agents acting alone (i.e., “robots”), or bound to welfare of non-deciding humans (i.e., “cyborgs”). Even less is known about the emotional reactions these interactions elicit. While other-regarding models of social preferences predict more trust-based investment in interactions that can benefit others, we see no difference across conditions in investments – only differences in emotional reactions to the trust-based interaction outcomes. The Recalibrational model of emotions predicts whether particular emotions are reported following trust-game interactions with people. Here we extend those emotion predictions to analogous trust based interactions, but with robots and cyborgs that violate certain expectations of human-human relationships. Using a between-subjects design, we compare investment and emotions from human-human trust games to investment and emotions from nearly identical trust games (a.k.a. “risk games”) that humans play with a robot or with a cyborg. Between conditions we find different emotional reactions but fail to find differences in investment behavior. These results highlight a unique emotional facet of human interaction while providing support for the Recalibration model of emotions.


  • Open Access

    TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND RULES

    by Thomas A. Rietz, Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

    Many economic interactions rely on trust and trust violations can have serious economic consequences. Simple minimum standard rules are attractive because they prevent egregious trust violations. However, they may undermine more trusting and reciprocal (trustworthy) behavior that otherwise would have occurred, leading to worse outcomes. In an experimental trust game, we test the efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum standard rules. Rules damage trust and reciprocity, reducing economic welfare. While sufficiently restrictive rules restore welfare, trust and reciprocity never return. Results indicate that participants are concerned about payoffs while also using the game to learn about trust and trustworthiness of others. (JEL C72, C90, D63, D64, L51)


  • Open Access

    The Problem with All-or-Nothing Trust Games: What Others Choose Not to Do Matters in Trust-Based Exchange

    by Eric Schniter, Roman M. Sheremeta, Timothy W. Shields

    Many economic interactions are characterized by “all-or-nothing” action spaces that may limit the demonstrability of intended trust. We investigate whether restricting investment opportunities to all-or-nothing options affects the investment rate and propensity to reciprocate. We do this by manipulating the investor’s action space in two versions of the trust game. In the all-or-nothing game the investor can invest either $10 (all) or $0 (nothing), while in the continuous game the investor can invest any amount between $10 and $0. In both games, the trustee receives the tripled investment and then can return any amount to the investor. Results indicate that investments are higher in the all-or-nothing game than in the continuous game. However, higher investments in the all-or-nothing game do not lead to higher returns. To the contrary, conditional on $10 investments, on average trustees return less in the all-or-nothing game. Although the all-or-nothing action space results in greater wealth overall, it also appears to “backfire” for investors who do not benefit from the increased wealth. These results support the proposition that humans perceive intentions not only by evaluating what others do but also by evaluating what others choose not to do.