Do Not Trust Power Management: A Survey on Internal Energy-based Attacks Circumventing Trusted Execution Environments Security Properties
Open Access
- 23 July 2025
- journal article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1-35
Abstract
Over the past few years, several research groups have introduced innovative hardware designs for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), aiming to secure applications against potentially compromised privileged software, including the kernel [ 10 , 63 ]. Since 2015 [ 94 ], a new class of software-enabled hardware attacks leveraging energy management mechanisms has emerged. These internal energy-based attacks comprise fault [ 86 ], side-channel [ 46 ], and covert channel attacks [ 28 ]. Their aim is to bypass TEE security guarantees and expose sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. They have increased in prevalence in the past few years [ 9 , 24 , 40 ]. Popular TEE implementations, such as ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX, incorporate countermeasures against these attacks. However, these countermeasures either hinder the capabilities of the power management mechanisms or have been shown to provide insufficient system protection [ 9 , 55 ]. This article presents the first comprehensive knowledge survey of these attacks, along with an evaluation of literature countermeasures. We believe that this study will spur further community efforts toward this increasingly important type of attacks.Keywords
All Related Versions
Funding Information
- young researcher (ANR-23-CE39-0003-01)
This publication has 74 references indexed in Scilit:
- Power Analysis Pushed too Far: Breaking Android-Based Isolation with Fuel Gauges2023
- DFAulted: Analyzing and Exploiting CPU Software Faults Caused by FPGA-Driven Undervolting AttacksIEEE Access, 2022
- Placement of on-chip distributed voltage regulators2022
- Energy Efficiency Aspects of the AMD Zen 2 Architecture2021
- Understanding Linux kernel vulnerabilitiesJournal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, 2021
- Cross-layer analysis of software fault models and countermeasures against hardware fault attacks in a RISC-V processorMicroprocessors and Microsystems, 2019
- How Secure Is Green IT? The Case of Software-Based Energy Side Channels2018
- A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardwareJournal of Cryptographic Engineering, 2016
- Threshold Implementations Against Side-Channel Attacks and Glitches2006
- Power attack resistant cryptosystem design: a dynamic voltage and frequency switching approach2005