Guillaume Bouffard
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Guillaume Bouffard has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jean-Louis Lanet
10 shared publicationsBhagyalekshmy N. Thampi
5 shared publicationsJean Dubreuil
Serma Safety & Security
3 shared publications- Jean-Louis Lanet
INRIA, LHS-PEC
3 shared publications - Gwenn Le Gonidec
Univ. Bretagne-Sud, Lab-STICC UMR CNRS 6285
2 shared publications - Jean-Christophe Prevotet
UnivRennes, INSA Rennes, CNRS, IETR-UMR 6164
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 468-491
A Lightweight Embedded Detection System Against Voltage Drop Fault Attacks in Multi-tenant FPGAs
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 468-491
A Lightweight Embedded Detection System Against Voltage Drop Fault Attacks in Multi-tenant FPGAs
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
A Generic Approach for Protecting Java Card™ Smart Card Against Software Attacks
Une approche générique pour protéger les cartes à puce Java Card ™ contre les attaques logicielles: De nos jours, la carte à puce est la pierre angulaire de nos usages quotidiens. En effet, elle est indispensable pour retirer de l'argent, voyager, téléphoner, ... Pour améliorer la sécurité tout en bénéficiant d'un environnement de développement facilité, la technologie Java a été adaptée pour être embarquée dans les cartes à puce. Présentée durant le milieu des années 90, cette technologie est devenue la plate-forme principale d'exécution d'applications sécurisées. De part leurs usages, ces applications contiennent des informations sensibles pouvant intéresser des personnes mal intentionnées.Dans le monde de la carte à puce, les concepteurs d'attaques et de contre-mesures se livrent une guerre sans fin. Afin d'avoir une vue générique de toutes les attaques possibles, nous proposons d'utiliser les arbres de fautes. Cette approche, inspirée de l'analyse de sûreté, aide à comprendre et à implémenter tous les événements désirables et non désirables existants. Nous appliquons cette méthode pour l'analyse de vulnérabilité Java Card. Pour cela, nous définissons des propriétés qui devront être garanties: l'intégrité et la confidentialité des données et du code contenus dans la carte à puce. Dans cette thèse, nous nous sommes focalisés sur l'intégrité du code des applications. En effet, une perturbation de cet élément peut corrompre les autres propriétés. En modélisant les conditions, nous avons découvert de nouveaux chemins d'attaques permettant d'accéder au contenu de la carte. Pour empêcher ces nouvelles attaques, nous présentons de nouvelles contre-mesures pour prévenir les éléments indésirables définis dans les arbres de fautes.
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur
A Generic Approach for Protecting Java Card™ Smart Card Against Software Attacks
Une approche générique pour protéger les cartes à puce Java Card ™ contre les attaques logicielles: De nos jours, la carte à puce est la pierre angulaire de nos usages quotidiens. En effet, elle est indispensable pour retirer de l'argent, voyager, téléphoner, ... Pour améliorer la sécurité tout en bénéficiant d'un environnement de développement facilité, la technologie Java a été adaptée pour être embarquée dans les cartes à puce. Présentée durant le milieu des années 90, cette technologie est devenue la plate-forme principale d'exécution d'applications sécurisées. De part leurs usages, ces applications contiennent des informations sensibles pouvant intéresser des personnes mal intentionnées.Dans le monde de la carte à puce, les concepteurs d'attaques et de contre-mesures se livrent une guerre sans fin. Afin d'avoir une vue générique de toutes les attaques possibles, nous proposons d'utiliser les arbres de fautes. Cette approche, inspirée de l'analyse de sûreté, aide à comprendre et à implémenter tous les événements désirables et non désirables existants. Nous appliquons cette méthode pour l'analyse de vulnérabilité Java Card. Pour cela, nous définissons des propriétés qui devront être garanties: l'intégrité et la confidentialité des données et du code contenus dans la carte à puce. Dans cette thèse, nous nous sommes focalisés sur l'intégrité du code des applications. En effet, une perturbation de cet élément peut corrompre les autres propriétés. En modélisant les conditions, nous avons découvert de nouveaux chemins d'attaques permettant d'accéder au contenu de la carte. Pour empêcher ces nouvelles attaques, nous présentons de nouvelles contre-mesures pour prévenir les éléments indésirables définis dans les arbres de fautes.
- Open Access
- 23 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1-35
Do Not Trust Power Management: A Survey on Internal Energy-based Attacks Circumventing Trusted Execution Environments Security Properties
Over the past few years, several research groups have introduced innovative hardware designs for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), aiming to secure applications against potentially compromised privileged software, including the kernel [ 10 , 63 ]. Since 2015 [ 94 ], a new class of software-enabled hardware attacks leveraging energy management mechanisms has emerged. These internal energy-based attacks comprise fault [ 86 ], side-channel [ 46 ], and covert channel attacks [ 28 ]. Their aim is to bypass TEE security guarantees and expose sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. They have increased in prevalence in the past few years [ 9 , 24 , 40 ]. Popular TEE implementations, such as ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX, incorporate countermeasures against these attacks. However, these countermeasures either hinder the capabilities of the power management mechanisms or have been shown to provide insufficient system protection [ 9 , 55 ]. This article presents the first comprehensive knowledge survey of these attacks, along with an evaluation of literature countermeasures. We believe that this study will spur further community efforts toward this increasingly important type of attacks.
- 23 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1-35
Open AccessDo Not Trust Power Management: A Survey on Internal Energy-based Attacks Circumventing Trusted Execution Environments Security Properties
Over the past few years, several research groups have introduced innovative hardware designs for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), aiming to secure applications against potentially compromised privileged software, including the kernel [ 10 , 63 ]. Since 2015 [ 94 ], a new class of software-enabled hardware attacks leveraging energy management mechanisms has emerged. These internal energy-based attacks comprise fault [ 86 ], side-channel [ 46 ], and covert channel attacks [ 28 ]. Their aim is to bypass TEE security guarantees and expose sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. They have increased in prevalence in the past few years [ 9 , 24 , 40 ]. Popular TEE implementations, such as ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX, incorporate countermeasures against these attacks. However, these countermeasures either hinder the capabilities of the power management mechanisms or have been shown to provide insufficient system protection [ 9 , 55 ]. This article presents the first comprehensive knowledge survey of these attacks, along with an evaluation of literature countermeasures. We believe that this study will spur further community efforts toward this increasingly important type of attacks.
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-21
Characterizing and Modeling Synchronous Clock-Glitch Fault Injection
- 3 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-21
Characterizing and Modeling Synchronous Clock-Glitch Fault Injection
- Open Access
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 311-319
Faulting original McEliece’s implementations is possible How to mitigate this risk?
Private and public actors increasingly encounter use cases where they need to implement sensitive operations on mass-market peripherals for which they have little or no control. They are sometimes inclined to attempt this without using hardware-assisted equipment, such as secure elements. In this case, the white-box attack model is particularly relevant and includes access to every asset, retro-engineering, and binary instrumentation by attackers. At the same time, quantum attacks are becoming more and more of a threat and challenge traditional asymmetrical ciphers, which are treasured by private and public actors.The McEliece cryptosystem is a code-based public key algorithm introduced in 1978 that is not subject to well-known quantum attacks and that could be implemented in an uncontrolled environment. During the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process [17], a derived candidate commonly referred to as classic McEliece was selected. This algorithm is however vulnerable to some fault injection attacks while a priori, this does not apply to the original McEliece. In this article, we thus focus on the original McEliece cryptosystem and we study its resilience against fault injection attacks on an ARM reference implementation [18]. We disclose the first fault injection based attack and we discuss on how to modify the original McEliece cryptosystem to make it resilient to fault injection attacks.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 311-319
Open AccessFaulting original McEliece’s implementations is possible How to mitigate this risk?
Private and public actors increasingly encounter use cases where they need to implement sensitive operations on mass-market peripherals for which they have little or no control. They are sometimes inclined to attempt this without using hardware-assisted equipment, such as secure elements. In this case, the white-box attack model is particularly relevant and includes access to every asset, retro-engineering, and binary instrumentation by attackers. At the same time, quantum attacks are becoming more and more of a threat and challenge traditional asymmetrical ciphers, which are treasured by private and public actors.The McEliece cryptosystem is a code-based public key algorithm introduced in 1978 that is not subject to well-known quantum attacks and that could be implemented in an uncontrolled environment. During the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process [17], a derived candidate commonly referred to as classic McEliece was selected. This algorithm is however vulnerable to some fault injection attacks while a priori, this does not apply to the original McEliece. In this article, we thus focus on the original McEliece cryptosystem and we study its resilience against fault injection attacks on an ARM reference implementation [18]. We disclose the first fault injection based attack and we discuss on how to modify the original McEliece cryptosystem to make it resilient to fault injection attacks.
- Open Access
Faulting original McEliece's implementations is possible: How to mitigate this risk?
Private and public actors increasingly encounter use cases where they need to implement sensitive operations on mass-market peripherals for which they have little or no control. They are sometimes inclined to attempt this without using hardware-assisted equipment, such as secure elements. In this case, the white-box attack model is particularly relevant and includes access to every asset, retro-engineering, and binary instrumentation by attackers. At the same time, quantum attacks are becoming more and more of a threat and challenge traditional asymmetrical ciphers, which are treasured by private and public actors. The McEliece cryptosystem is a code-based public key algorithm introduced in 1978 that is not subject to well-known quantum attacks and that could be implemented in an uncontrolled environment. During the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process, a derived candidate commonly refer to as classic McEliece was selected. This algorithm is however vulnerable to some fault injection attacks while a priori, this does not apply to the original McEliece. In this article, we thus focus on the original McEliece cryptosystem and we study its resilience against fault injection attacks on an ARM reference implementation. We disclose the first fault injection based attack and we discuss on how to modify the original McEliece cryptosystem to make it resilient to fault injection attacks.
Open AccessFaulting original McEliece's implementations is possible: How to mitigate this risk?
Private and public actors increasingly encounter use cases where they need to implement sensitive operations on mass-market peripherals for which they have little or no control. They are sometimes inclined to attempt this without using hardware-assisted equipment, such as secure elements. In this case, the white-box attack model is particularly relevant and includes access to every asset, retro-engineering, and binary instrumentation by attackers. At the same time, quantum attacks are becoming more and more of a threat and challenge traditional asymmetrical ciphers, which are treasured by private and public actors. The McEliece cryptosystem is a code-based public key algorithm introduced in 1978 that is not subject to well-known quantum attacks and that could be implemented in an uncontrolled environment. During the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process, a derived candidate commonly refer to as classic McEliece was selected. This algorithm is however vulnerable to some fault injection attacks while a priori, this does not apply to the original McEliece. In this article, we thus focus on the original McEliece cryptosystem and we study its resilience against fault injection attacks on an ARM reference implementation. We disclose the first fault injection based attack and we discuss on how to modify the original McEliece cryptosystem to make it resilient to fault injection attacks.
- 19 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (4) , 353-367
Electromagnetic fault injection against a complex CPU, toward new micro-architectural fault models
- 19 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (4) , 353-367
Electromagnetic fault injection against a complex CPU, toward new micro-architectural fault models
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 7 (1) , 21-34
Trust can be misplaced
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 7 (1) , 21-34
Trust can be misplaced