Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election
Authors:
- Antoinette BaujardABAntoinette Baujard
- Herrade IgersheimHIHerrade Igersheim
- Isabelle LebonILIsabelle Lebon
- Frédéric GavrelFGFrédéric Gavrel
- Jean-François LaslierJLJean-François Laslier
- 1 June 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 34, 131-145
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
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