Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production
Authors:
- Fahad KhalilFKFahad Khalil
- Jacques LawarreeJLJacques Lawarree
- Alexander RodivilovARAlexander Rodivilov
- 1 November 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 190
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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