Jacques Lawarree
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Jacques Lawarree has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Chen-Ching Liu
8 shared publicationsFahad Khalil
4 shared publications- Fahad Khalil
University of Washington - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
4 shared publications Fred Kofman
MIT Sloan School of Management
3 shared publicationsC.-C. Liu
2 shared publicationsDoyoung Kim
Department of Economics Sogang University Seoul South Korea
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 7 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 31 (3) , 762-783
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium
We present a principal–auditor–agent model with adverse selection where the agent can bribe the auditor and the auditor can extort the agent. We show that it is optimal to deter extortion but allow bribery, and we analyze the impact of honest agents in this setting. Unlike strategic agents, honest agents refuse to bribe and therefore cannot reap the benefit of bribery. This unwillingness to bribe raises the cost of participation of honest agents and creates a negative externality by offering a scope for rent to all strategic agents. This negative externality is larger when an agent's bargaining strength is higher. We find that the principal's payoff is nonmonotonic in honesty, and increasing honesty is helpful only if it is widespread enough, leading to a potential corruption trap. We also show that an increase in productivity lowers the threshold for honesty to be beneficial.
- 7 February 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 31 (3) , 762-783
Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium
We present a principal–auditor–agent model with adverse selection where the agent can bribe the auditor and the auditor can extort the agent. We show that it is optimal to deter extortion but allow bribery, and we analyze the impact of honest agents in this setting. Unlike strategic agents, honest agents refuse to bribe and therefore cannot reap the benefit of bribery. This unwillingness to bribe raises the cost of participation of honest agents and creates a negative externality by offering a scope for rent to all strategic agents. This negative externality is larger when an agent's bargaining strength is higher. We find that the principal's payoff is nonmonotonic in honesty, and increasing honesty is helpful only if it is widespread enough, leading to a potential corruption trap. We also show that an increase in productivity lowers the threshold for honesty to be beneficial.
- 2 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 179-206
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
- 2 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 179-206
Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 190
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 190
Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production
- 16 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 21 (6) , 991-1016
Use it or lose it
We examine the optimality of budget policies imposed by a funding authority on a bureaucrat who operates under a fixed budget. In particular, we study a “use‐it‐or‐lose‐it” (UILI) policy under which the bureaucrat has to return any unspent budget without being able to “roll over” any part to the next period. Instead of returning the unspent budget, the bureaucrat can go on a spending spree and engage in policy drift, which is inversely related to his motivation. The bureaucrat's motivation represents how well matched he is with the bureaucracy's mission. We show that a UILI policy is complementary to motivation as it has stronger ex ante positive incentive effects on more motivated bureaucrats. Such ex ante positive effects can overcome the ex post inefficiency of the policy and make a UILI policy optimal when the bureaucrat is well matched with the bureaucracy's mission or when its budget is large.
- 16 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 21 (6) , 991-1016
Use it or lose it
We examine the optimality of budget policies imposed by a funding authority on a bureaucrat who operates under a fixed budget. In particular, we study a “use‐it‐or‐lose‐it” (UILI) policy under which the bureaucrat has to return any unspent budget without being able to “roll over” any part to the next period. Instead of returning the unspent budget, the bureaucrat can go on a spending spree and engage in policy drift, which is inversely related to his motivation. The bureaucrat's motivation represents how well matched he is with the bureaucracy's mission. We show that a UILI policy is complementary to motivation as it has stronger ex ante positive incentive effects on more motivated bureaucrats. Such ex ante positive effects can overcome the ex post inefficiency of the policy and make a UILI policy optimal when the bureaucrat is well matched with the bureaucracy's mission or when its budget is large.
- 26 October 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (4) , 872-890
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so‐called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties whereas money is equally valuable to all parties. Furthermore, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion.
- 26 October 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (4) , 872-890
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so‐called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties whereas money is equally valuable to all parties. Furthermore, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion.
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (4) , 686-711
Contracts offered by bureaucrats
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low‐powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low‐powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (4) , 686-711
Contracts offered by bureaucrats
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low‐powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low‐powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.
- 20 January 2010
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 41 (1) , 179-198
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
- 20 January 2010
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 41 (1) , 179-198
Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 165 (2) , 281-306
On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
According to Beckers human-capital theory, employers tend to underinvest in general training relative to specific training because it increases their existing employees outside opportunities. We show that this is not necessarily true if training has an information-gathering function that allows an agent to learn his skills. An example is the training of new hires. When training creates an information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the principal may overinvest in general training relative to specific training. General training helps the principal reduce the incentive problem inside the firm. Beckers result of underinvestment in general training may not hold when training creates asymmetric information.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 165 (2) , 281-306
On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
According to Beckers human-capital theory, employers tend to underinvest in general training relative to specific training because it increases their existing employees outside opportunities. We show that this is not necessarily true if training has an information-gathering function that allows an agent to learn his skills. An example is the training of new hires. When training creates an information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, the principal may overinvest in general training relative to specific training. General training helps the principal reduce the incentive problem inside the firm. Beckers result of underinvestment in general training may not hold when training creates asymmetric information.
- 29 January 2007
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Vol. 22 (1) , 266-274
Day-Ahead Electricity Price Forecasting in a Grid Environment
Accurate electricity price forecasting is critical to market participants in wholesale electricity markets. Market participants rely on price forecasts to decide their bidding strategies, allocate assets, negotiate bilateral contracts, hedge risks, and plan facility investments. Market operators can also use electricity price forecasts to predict market power indexes for the purpose of monitoring participants' behaviors. Various forecasting techniques are applied to different time horizons for electricity price forecasting in locational marginal pricing (LMP) spot markets. Available correlated data also have to be selected to improve the short-term forecasting performance. In this paper, fuzzy inference system (FIS), least-squares estimation (LSE), and the combination of FIS and LSE are proposed. Based on extensive testing with various techniques, LSE provides the most accurate results, and FIS, which is also highly accurate, provides transparency and interpretability
- 29 January 2007
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Vol. 22 (1) , 266-274
Day-Ahead Electricity Price Forecasting in a Grid Environment
Accurate electricity price forecasting is critical to market participants in wholesale electricity markets. Market participants rely on price forecasts to decide their bidding strategies, allocate assets, negotiate bilateral contracts, hedge risks, and plan facility investments. Market operators can also use electricity price forecasts to predict market power indexes for the purpose of monitoring participants' behaviors. Various forecasting techniques are applied to different time horizons for electricity price forecasting in locational marginal pricing (LMP) spot markets. Available correlated data also have to be selected to improve the short-term forecasting performance. In this paper, fuzzy inference system (FIS), least-squares estimation (LSE), and the combination of FIS and LSE are proposed. Based on extensive testing with various techniques, LSE provides the most accurate results, and FIS, which is also highly accurate, provides transparency and interpretability
- 11 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
State-of-the-art of electricity price forecasting
- 11 October 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
State-of-the-art of electricity price forecasting