Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms*
- 13 September 2011
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 114 (1) , 177-199
Abstract
We analyse how different labour‐market institutions – employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’– affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour‐saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers – unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, as this increases the downside (job losses) of labour‐saving technology.Keywords
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