Institutions matter, but which ones?
- 1 July 2005
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics of Transition
- Vol. 13 (3) , 499-532
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the narrow focus of the current institutional economics literature in development on the institutions protecting individual property rights, and to look at the economic effects of some other aspects of institutional quality on the development process (like democratic participation rights and institutions to address coordination failures). Another purpose is to suggest an alternative instrumental variable in quantifying the effects of property rights institutions. Finally, we speculate how, on account of distributive conflicts, institutions that have an adverse effect on economic performance often tend to persist for long periods of time in many poor countries.Keywords
This publication has 43 references indexed in Scilit:
- Related Lending and Economic Performance: Evidence from MexicoSSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
- Growth, institutions and knowledge: a review and reflection on the historiography of 18th–20th century ChinaAustralian Economic History Review, 2004
- Inequality, Coalitions and Collective ActionSSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
- Relation‐based versus Rule‐based Governance: an Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Asian CrisisReview of International Economics, 2003
- Related LendingThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003
- The quality of governmentThe Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1999
- Theories of “bad policy”The Journal of Policy Reform, 1998
- The Tyranny of the Inefficient: An Enquiry into the Adverse Consequences of Power StrugglesSSRN Electronic Journal, 1997
- Redistributive Politics and Economic EfficiencyAmerican Political Science Review, 1995
- AGRARIAN CLASS STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPEPast & Present, 1976