The Short-Termism Trap: Competition for Informed Investors Under Stock-Based CEO Compensation
Authors:
Preprint
- 31 October 2021
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We show that stock-based CEO compensation can create a "race to the bottom" among firms that escalates short-termist pressure. More informative stock prices reduce the agency cost of using stock-based compensation to incentivize managers. Also, shortening a firm's project maturity improves stock price informativeness by attracting informed investors, who prefer to invest in short-term assets. However, when informed trading is a scarce resource, this is a prisoners' dilemma game: competition for informed investors creates excessive short-termism that destroys shareholder value, while in equilibrium, price informativeness stays the same. More intense competition between firms sharpens incentives to shorten project maturity, deepening the "short-termism trap."Keywords
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