JHJungsuk Han

Jungsuk Han

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Jungsuk Han has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Fragmentation or Specialization? Economic Sorting in the Public Blockchain Ecosystem

    by Jongsub Lee, Jungsuk Han, Jaewoo Cho

    The proliferation of public blockchain rails need not fragment monetary networks; it can instead reflect economic specialization. We develop a model in which heterogeneous economic functions sort across validation rails according to their security intensity. A single-crossing condition assigns high-value, security-sensitive activity to high-validation rails and frequent, low-value activity to lower-cost rails. We then embed this sorting mechanism in a supermodular adoption game. Because network effects operate across distinct functions of the same monetary claim, adoption in one function complements adoption in others even when those functions reside on different rails. The strength of these cross-function complementarities depends on interoperability, giving rise to low-and high-adoption equilibria and rendering the high-adoption equilibrium fragile to disruptions in interoperability or par convertibility. Using transaction-level data for USDC and USDT across seven major blockchains, we find that more secure rails process larger transfers, and issuer-level growth traces the model's high-and low adoption branches. An early-2024 Ethereum fee shock further shifts activity away from small transfers and toward larger transactions. Together, our results suggest that multi-chain stablecoin activity can preserve monetary network effects through interoperable specialization rather than uniformity on a single ledger.

  • Decentralized Autonomous Organization Governance

    by Jungsuk Han, Jongsub Lee, Tao Li

    Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are entities without central leadership and operate based on a set of decision-making rules encoded into smart contracts using blockchain technology. In this study, we develop a theoretical model of DAO governance featuring strategic token trading under token-based voting to investigate potential conflicts of interest between a large participant (a “whale”) and many small participants. Our results show that ownership concentration has a negative effect on platform growth, but platform size, token illiquidity, and long-term incentives can mitigate this negative effect. We confirm these predictions using novel voting data on major DAOs from 2020 and 2024. This paper has been accepted by Lin William Cong for the Virtual Special Issue on Digital Finance. Funding: J. Han and J. Lee received financial support from the Institute of Management Research at Seoul National University. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07033 .


  • Open Access

    From Tulip to Gold: Rational Bubbles in Consumable Assets

    by Jungsuk Han, Yenan Wang

    Why do some bubbles survive as stores of value while others collapse? We study this question in an overlapping-generations model in which a consumable asset can be held for resale or consumed. Even a low consumption value eliminates the possibility of a continuum of self-fulfilling price paths sustained by a pure bubble and selects a unique equilibrium. When consumption value is stochastic, the prospect of a high-value state raises the asset's capacity to transfer wealth across generations; when that state arrives, partial consumption reduces circulating supply and raises the price of the remaining units. With endogenous supply, bubble durability depends on scarcity. Elastic supply pushes the asset toward recurrent production and consumption, as with tulips, whereas inelastic supply can sustain a persistent store-of-value premium, as with gold. The framework also clarifies the limits of the "digital gold" analogy.

  • Open Access

    DAO Governance

    by Jungsuk Han, Jongsub Lee, Tao Li

    Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are entities without central leadership and operate based on a set of decision-making rules encoded into smart contracts using blockchain technology. In this study, we develop a theoretical model of DAO governance featuring strategic token trading under token-based voting to investigate potential conflicts of interest between a large participant (a "whale") and many small participants. Our results show that ownership concentration has a negative effect on platform growth, but platform size, token illiquidity, and long-term incentives can mitigate its negative effect. We confirm these predictions using novel voting data on major DAOs between 2020 and 2024.


  • Open Access

    A Review of DAO Governance: Recent Literature and Emerging Trends

    by Jungsuk Han, Jongsub Lee, Tao Li

    Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged as a new organizational structure that leverages smart contracts and blockchain technology. Academics and practitioners have paid significant attention to DAOs, yet DAO decision-making processes and the broader implications remain under-studied. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. First, we compare the proposal-and voting-based governance mechanisms of DAOs with those of traditional corporate governance. Second, we introduce various novel voting models adopted by DAOs. Third, we discuss DAOs' drawbacks and highlight a unique agency problem arising from large token holders, termed "whales," within these organizations. The concentrated ownership such whales, whose interests may diverge from those of smaller token holders (i.e., users), obtain can result in governance vulnerabilities. After discussing recent instances of investor activism and contentious votes involving DAOs, we conclude by surveying the literature on the optimal DAO design.

  • Open Access

    Demographic Decline and the Dynamics of Asset Bubbles: Implications for South Korea's Asset Markets

    by Jungsuk Han

    This paper examines the dynamics of asset bubbles in an overlapping generations economy experiencing population decline. We incorporate a stochastic Markov process to model uncertain demographic transitions, including the possibility of stabilization. Our analysis shows that declining population levels endogenously undermine bubble sustainability by raising per capita participation costs in asset markets. Even when the eventual collapse lies far in the future, forward-looking agents rationally anticipate it, leading to a gradual erosion of asset valuations. These findings uncover a novel mechanism through which demographic fundamentals-particularly persistent low fertility and population aging-can destabilize financial markets, offering new insights into asset pricing in an era of demographic decline.

  • Open Access

    DAO Governance

    by Jungsuk Han, Jongsub Lee, Tao Li

    Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are entities without central leadership that operate based on a set of decision-making rules encoded into smart contracts using blockchain technology. In this study, we develop a theoretical model of DAO governance featuring strategic token trading under token-based voting to investigate potential conflicts of interest between a large participant (a whale) and many small participants. Our results show that ownership concentration is negatively related to platform growth, but platform size, token illiquidity, and long-term incentives can mitigate the negative effects. We confirm these predictions using novel voting data on over 200 DAOs between 2020 and 2022.


  • Open Access

    The Short-Termism Trap: Competition for Informed Investors Under Stock-Based CEO Compensation

    by James Dow, Jungsuk Han, Francesco Sangiorgi

    We show that stock-based CEO compensation can create a "race to the bottom" among firms that escalates short-termist pressure. More informative stock prices reduce the agency cost of using stock-based compensation to incentivize managers. Also, shortening a firm's project maturity improves stock price informativeness by attracting informed investors, who prefer to invest in short-term assets. However, when informed trading is a scarce resource, this is a prisoners' dilemma game: competition for informed investors creates excessive short-termism that destroys shareholder value, while in equilibrium, price informativeness stays the same. More intense competition between firms sharpens incentives to shorten project maturity, deepening the "short-termism trap."

  • Speculative Equilibrium with Differences in Higher-Order Beliefs

    by Jungsuk Han, Albert S. Kyle

    Modest differences in higher-order beliefs may have large price effects. We generalize a standard rational expectations equilibrium model with different information by allowing differences in higher-order beliefs. Investors have possibly different dogmatic beliefs about the mean, different dogmatic beliefs about other investors’ beliefs, and so on for higher and higher orders of beliefs. Even when every investor’s first-order expectations are unbiased, overvaluation results when investors have inconsistent higher-order beliefs that their own expectations are more optimistic than average. This lack of common knowledge destabilizes prices in an unbounded manner as market liquidity disappears. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.


  • Searching for information

    by Jungsuk Han, Francesco Sangiorgi