Do Good Institutions Promote Countercyclical Macroeconomic Policies?
Authors:
- CalderónCACalderón
- CésarCÉCésar
- Roberto DuncanRDRoberto Duncan
- Klaus Schmidt‐HebbelKSKlaus Schmidt‐Hebbel
- 13 February 2016
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 78 (5) , 650-670
Abstract
The literature has argued that developing countries are unable to adopt countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies due to financial imperfections and unfavourable political‐economy conditions. Using a world sample of up to 112 industrial and developing countries for 1984–2008, we find that the level of institutional quality plays a key role in countries’ ability and willingness to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies. Countries with strong (weak) institutions adopt countercyclical (procyclical) macroeconomic policies, reflected in extended monetary policy and fiscal policy rules. The threshold levels of institutional quality at which policies are acyclical are found to be similar for monetary and fiscal policy.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico (1060175)
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