An objection to the modal account of risk
Author:
Open Access
- 25 April 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (5) , 1-9
Abstract
In a recent paper in this journal Duncan Pritchard responds to an objection to the modal account of risk pressed by Ebert, Smith and Durbach (2020). In this paper, I expand upon the objection and argue that it still stands. I go on to consider a more general question raised by this exchange – whether risk is ‘objective’, or whether it is something that varies from one perspective to another.Keywords
Funding Information
- Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/T002638/1)
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