Martin Smith
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Martin Smith has a total of 58 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alberta King-Farlow
Berlin
2 shared publicationsAlejandro Luis
Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications- Barbara M. Sattler
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
2 shared publications Brad Graham
Bochum, Germany
2 shared publicationsChapel Hill
University of Pittsburgh
2 shared publicationsChristian Wildberg
Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (2) , 103
Privileged worlds, additivity and maximal risk
In ‘The unified theory of risk’ (2024) Jaakko Hirvelä and Niall Paterson consider the recent debate between the probabilistic, modal and normic theories of risk, and propose an intriguing new account – the titular unified theory . In this paper I focus on Hirvelä and Paterson’s criticisms of the normic theory, which are based on what they call the ‘privileged world problem’ and on the idea that risks ‘add up’. I will argue that these criticisms can, to an extent, be avoided by adopting a certain reinterpretation of the normic theory, particularly as it pertains to the notion of maximal risk . I then turn to the unified theory of risk and argue that, on close inspection, the theory is very similar to one of the rival theories that it purports to unify – namely, the probabilistic theory – and may share its shortcomings.
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (2) , 103
Open AccessPrivileged worlds, additivity and maximal risk
In ‘The unified theory of risk’ (2024) Jaakko Hirvelä and Niall Paterson consider the recent debate between the probabilistic, modal and normic theories of risk, and propose an intriguing new account – the titular unified theory . In this paper I focus on Hirvelä and Paterson’s criticisms of the normic theory, which are based on what they call the ‘privileged world problem’ and on the idea that risks ‘add up’. I will argue that these criticisms can, to an extent, be avoided by adopting a certain reinterpretation of the normic theory, particularly as it pertains to the notion of maximal risk . I then turn to the unified theory of risk and argue that, on close inspection, the theory is very similar to one of the rival theories that it purports to unify – namely, the probabilistic theory – and may share its shortcomings.
- Open Access
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (11-12) , 3247-3267
Moral encroachment and group-to-individual inferences
The paper is concerned with a special class of inferences, in which we draw conclusions about individual people based on evidence about the groups to which they belong. One thing that is notable about these inferences is that they are often subject to a kind of moral criticism. By judging people in this way, it is claimed, we demean or diminish them, and fail to properly respect them as individuals. And yet, if these inferences are epistemically sound – as they sometimes appear to be – then we face the possibility of a clash between moral and epistemic norms. One way to avoid this clash is through the thesis of moral encroachment – the idea that standards of epistemic justification are themselves sensitive to moral considerations and, in particular, can become more stringent when a belief has the potential to morally wrong others. In this paper I offer some reasons for doubting this thesis, and argue that group-to-individual inferences are, in the end, better understood through a more traditional framework on which epistemic justification is determined purely by the nature of one’s evidence.
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (11-12) , 3247-3267
Open AccessMoral encroachment and group-to-individual inferences
The paper is concerned with a special class of inferences, in which we draw conclusions about individual people based on evidence about the groups to which they belong. One thing that is notable about these inferences is that they are often subject to a kind of moral criticism. By judging people in this way, it is claimed, we demean or diminish them, and fail to properly respect them as individuals. And yet, if these inferences are epistemically sound – as they sometimes appear to be – then we face the possibility of a clash between moral and epistemic norms. One way to avoid this clash is through the thesis of moral encroachment – the idea that standards of epistemic justification are themselves sensitive to moral considerations and, in particular, can become more stringent when a belief has the potential to morally wrong others. In this paper I offer some reasons for doubting this thesis, and argue that group-to-individual inferences are, in the end, better understood through a more traditional framework on which epistemic justification is determined purely by the nature of one’s evidence.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
How to Model Lexical Priority
A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R2 just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2—no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems—a fact which is sometimes spun as a “decision theoretic critique” of lexical priority. In this paper, I develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of modelling lexical priority while avoiding all extant problems. This will involve introducing several new ingredients into the standard decision theoretic framework, including multidimensional utilities, de minimis risks, and the means to represent two different conceptions of risk.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
Open AccessHow to Model Lexical Priority
A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R2 just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2—no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems—a fact which is sometimes spun as a “decision theoretic critique” of lexical priority. In this paper, I develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of modelling lexical priority while avoiding all extant problems. This will involve introducing several new ingredients into the standard decision theoretic framework, including multidimensional utilities, de minimis risks, and the means to represent two different conceptions of risk.
- Open Access
- 21 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (12) , 3459-3475
Is it ever rational to hold inconsistent beliefs?
In this paper I investigate whether there are any cases in which it is rational for a person to hold inconsistent beliefs and, if there are, just what implications this might have for the theory of epistemic justification. A number of issues will crop up along the way – including the relation between justification and rationality, the nature of defeat, the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, the importance of positive epistemic duties, and the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes.
- 21 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (12) , 3459-3475
Open AccessIs it ever rational to hold inconsistent beliefs?
In this paper I investigate whether there are any cases in which it is rational for a person to hold inconsistent beliefs and, if there are, just what implications this might have for the theory of epistemic justification. A number of issues will crop up along the way – including the relation between justification and rationality, the nature of defeat, the possibility of epistemic dilemmas, the importance of positive epistemic duties, and the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes.
- Open Access
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (5) , 1-9
An objection to the modal account of risk
In a recent paper in this journal Duncan Pritchard responds to an objection to the modal account of risk pressed by Ebert, Smith and Durbach (2020). In this paper, I expand upon the objection and argue that it still stands. I go on to consider a more general question raised by this exchange – whether risk is ‘objective’, or whether it is something that varies from one perspective to another.
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (5) , 1-9
Open AccessAn objection to the modal account of risk
In a recent paper in this journal Duncan Pritchard responds to an objection to the modal account of risk pressed by Ebert, Smith and Durbach (2020). In this paper, I expand upon the objection and argue that it still stands. I go on to consider a more general question raised by this exchange – whether risk is ‘objective’, or whether it is something that varies from one perspective to another.
- Open Access
- 31 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (6) , 2169-2192
Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk
A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk.
- 31 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (6) , 2169-2192
Open AccessDecision Theory and De Minimis Risk
A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk.
- Open Access
- 12 September 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Apeiron
- Vol. 56 (3)
Frontmatter
Article Frontmatter was published on July 1, 2023 in the journal Apeiron (volume 56, issue 3).
- 12 September 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Apeiron
- Vol. 56 (3)
Open AccessFrontmatter
Article Frontmatter was published on July 1, 2023 in the journal Apeiron (volume 56, issue 3).
- Open Access
- 22 July 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Apeiron
- Vol. 56 (2)
Frontmatter
Article Frontmatter was published on April 1, 2023 in the journal Apeiron (volume 56, issue 2).
- 22 July 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Apeiron
- Vol. 56 (2)
Open AccessFrontmatter
Article Frontmatter was published on April 1, 2023 in the journal Apeiron (volume 56, issue 2).
- Open Access
- 14 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (3) , 1-18
Two accounts of assertion
In this paper I will compare two competing accounts of assertion: the knowledge account and the justified belief account. When it comes to the evidence that is typically used to assess accounts of assertion—including the evidence from lottery propositions, the evidence from Moore’s paradoxical propositions and the evidence from conversational patterns—I will argue that the justified belief account has at least as much explanatory power as its rival. I will argue, finally, that a close look at the ways in which assertions can be challenged and retracted reveals a certain advantage for the justified belief account. The paper will touch upon a number of further topics along the way, including the logical interaction between knowledge and justified belief, the nature of defeat, and the hypothesis that knowledge and justified belief are normatively coincident goals.
- 14 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (3) , 1-18
Open AccessTwo accounts of assertion
In this paper I will compare two competing accounts of assertion: the knowledge account and the justified belief account. When it comes to the evidence that is typically used to assess accounts of assertion—including the evidence from lottery propositions, the evidence from Moore’s paradoxical propositions and the evidence from conversational patterns—I will argue that the justified belief account has at least as much explanatory power as its rival. I will argue, finally, that a close look at the ways in which assertions can be challenged and retracted reveals a certain advantage for the justified belief account. The paper will touch upon a number of further topics along the way, including the logical interaction between knowledge and justified belief, the nature of defeat, and the hypothesis that knowledge and justified belief are normatively coincident goals.