How (Not) to Raise Money
Authors:
- Jacob K. GoereeJacob K. Goeree
- Emiel MaaslandEMEmiel Maasland
- Sander OnderstalSOSander Onderstal
- John L. TurnerJTJohn L. Turner
- 1 August 2005
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 113 (4) , 897-918
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid CapsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2002
- Auction Theory: A Guide to the LiteratureJournal of Economic Surveys, 1999
- Toeholds and TakeoversJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Takeover Bidding with Toeholds: The Case of the Owner's CurseThe Review of Financial Studies, 1998
- An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay AuctionJournal of Economic Theory, 1997
- Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover ContestsThe Journal of Finance, 1995
- Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to BiddersGames and Economic Behavior, 1994
- Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English AuctionsJournal of Political Economy, 1987
- Dissolving a Partnership EfficientlyEconometrica, 1987
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" ProblemEconometrica, 1977