SOSander Onderstal

Sander Onderstal

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Sander Onderstal has a total of 63 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Online experimental auctions for sustainable food choices

    by Anouar El Haji, Jayson L. Lusk, Ayşe Gül Mermer, Sander Onderstal

  • Open Access

    Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk

    by Sander Onderstal, Shaul Shalvi, Ivan Soraperra

  • Open Access

    A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions

    by Xinyu Li, Marco A. Haan, Sander Onderstal, Jasper Veldman

  • Open Access

    Can Collaboration Promote Corporate Social Responsibility? Evidence From the Lab

    by Francisco Gomez Martinez, Sander Onderstal, Maarten Pieter Schinkel

    Do agreements among competitors regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) promote public‐interest objectives? We address this question theoretically and experimentally in a duopoly framework in which firms choose between offering a “fair” and an “unfair” good to consumers. When the unfair good is traded, a negative externality is imposed on a third party. We vary whether or not the firms are allowed to coordinate on the type of good they sell, while remaining in price competition. We experimentally find, as the theory predicts, that only pairs of firms with low other‐regarding preferences take the opportunity to coordinate CSR to differentiate their products, implying an increase in trade of the fair good. Yet there is an indication that consumers are harmed on balance. In the total sample, there is no significant impact on the fraction of fair goods traded, average market prices, producer surplus, and consumer surplus. Other‐regarding preferences seem more important drivers of socially responsible behavior than opportunities for firms to coordinate their CSR activities.


  • Open Access

    Punching above One’s Weight–On Overcommitment in Election Campaigns

    by Marco A. Haan, Sander Onderstal, Yohanes E. Riyanto

    In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to study how candidates compete in elections when voters care about the winner’s ability to implement policies. In our model, the candidates make commitments before the election regarding the plans they will try to implement if elected. These commitments serve as a signal of ability. In equilibrium, candidates make overambitious promises. While the candidate with the highest ability wins, the electorate may be better off having a random candidate implement her best plan, rather than seeing the winner implementing an overambitious plan.

  • Open Access

    Optimal (Non-)Disclosure Defaults

    by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Sander Onderstal, Francesco Parisi, Ram Singh

    Sellers are generally required to disclose “negative” information about hidden defects of the products they sell. By contrast, buyers are generally under no comparable duties to disclose “positive” information about hidden qualities of the products they buy. The leading explanation for the law’s disparate treatment of buyers and sellers is that imposing disclosure duties on buyers would undermine their incentives to acquire costly (but socially useful) information prior to the purchase. This explanation lacks a key step: the failure to correct asymmetric information problems ex post would cause an inverse adverse selection problem ex ante. Uninformed sellers would withdraw from the market and resources would not move to higher-valuing (informed) buyers. In this paper, we develop a model that balances the benefits of information acquisition with the costs of asymmetric information, and study the incentives created by disclosure and non-disclosure rules. We show that when parties can contract around defaults at a cost, the choice of alternative disclosure rules makes a difference. Unlike disclosure rules, nondisclosure default rules yield partially separating equilibria that preserve the buyers’ incentives to acquire information and foster trade opportunities between expert buyers and uninformed sellers.

  • Open Access

    Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future

    by Jeroen Hinloopen, Sander Onderstal, Adriaan Soetevent

    This special issue marks the 25th anniversary of the introduction of a leniency program for antitrust in the EU and contains five original papers: Each paper examines the effects of design parameters of leniency programs on their performance. Before introducing each contribution separately, we put them in perspective by introducing readers to the existing theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature on corporate leniency programs for antitrust.


  • Open Access

    Information-Forcing Effects of Non-Disclosure Rules

    by Francesco Parisi, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Sander Onderstal, Ram Singh

    Contract law traditionally applies different disclosure duties on buyers and sellers. Sellers are generally required to disclose “negative” information about hidden defects of the products they sell, and failure to disclose can make the contract voidable and give rise to liability. By contrast, buyers are generally under no comparable duties to disclose “positive” information about hidden qualities of the products they buy. The leading explanation for the different treatment of buyers and sellers in these two asymmetric information problems is that disclosure duties on buyers would undermine their incentives to acquire costly (but socially useful) information prior to the contract (Kronman, 1978). The missing step in this explanation is the realization that by failing to correct asymmetric information problems, the inverse adverse selection problem identified by Burckart and Lee (2016) and Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2021) would arise. Uninformed sellers would withdraw from the market and resources would not move to higher valuing uses anyway. In this paper, we develop a model to study the incentives created by disclosure and nondisclosure rules. We show that when parties can contract around defaults, the choice of alternative disclosure rules (duty to disclose vs. no duty to disclose) makes a difference. Unlike disclosure rules, non-disclosure default rules yield partially separating equilibria that preserve the buyers’ incentives to acquire information and fostering trade opportunities between expert buyers and uninformed sellers. Our results add to the existing literature by providing an additional rationale for the different treatment of buyers and sellers in asymmetric information problems.