Habit: A Rylean Conception
Open Access
- 18 April 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 7 (2) , 45
Abstract
Tennis champion Maria Sharapova has a habit of grunting when she plays on the court. Assume that she also has a habit of hitting the ball in a certain way in a certain situation. The habit of on-court grunting might be bad, but can the habit of hitting the ball in a certain way in a certain situation be classified as intelligent? The fundamental questions here are as follows: What is habit? What is the relation between habit and skill? Is there such a thing as intelligent habit? In this paper I expound the nature of habit by developing and defending a Rylean conception of habit, according to which an acquired disposition is a habit if and only if the manifestation of the disposition is repeated, automatic, and uniform. One implication of this conception is that there is no such thing as intelligent habit. A practical application in athletic expertise is that sport coaches can help athletes go beyond repeated, automatic, and uniform dispositions in sport.Keywords
Funding Information
- Ministry of Science and Technology Taiwan (MOST103-2410-H-001-108-MY5 & MOST110-2420-H-003-006)
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