Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations
Top Cited Papers
- 20 February 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 58 (2) , 295-332
Abstract
We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.Keywords
This publication has 68 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strategic Leniency and Cartel EnforcementAmerican Economic Review, 2009
- OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS*The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008
- Collusion under monitoring of salesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2007
- Redacted DisclosureJournal of Accounting Research, 2006
- What Determines Cartel Success?Journal of Economic Literature, 2006
- How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004
- Optimal Leniency ProgramsSSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
- Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor Vehicle IndustryJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Price leadership in a duopoly with capacity constraints and product differentiationJournal of Economics, 1993
- Trade Associations as Information Exchange MechanismsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1988