Alminas Žaldokas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alminas Žaldokas has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Aurelija Proškutė
Bank of Lithuania, Lithuania
1 shared publication- Dong
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
1 shared publication - Farzad Saidi
University of Bonn
1 shared publication - Guoman She
National University of Singapore, Singapore 119077
1 shared publication - Jura Liaukonyte
Cornell University
1 shared publication - Massimo Massa
INSEAD
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 216, 287-307
How do firms adjust when trade stops?
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 216, 287-307
How do firms adjust when trade stops?
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (4) , 2465-2484
Background Noise? TV Advertising Affects Real-Time Investor Behavior
Using minute-by-minute TV advertising data covering some 300 firms, 327,000 ads, and $20 billion in ad spending, we study the real-time effects of TV advertising on investors’ searches for online financial information and subsequent trading activity. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that viewers in different U.S. time zones are exposed to the same programming and national advertising at different times, allowing us to control for contemporaneous confounding events. We find that an average TV ad leads to a 3% increase in EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) system queries and an 8% increase in Google searches for financial information within 15 minutes of the airing of that ad. These searches translate into larger trading volume on the advertiser’s stock, driven primarily by retail investors. The findings on retail investor ad-induced trading are corroborated with hourly data from Robinhood, a popular retail trading platform. We also show that ads induce searches and trading of companies other than the advertiser, including of close rivals. Altogether, our findings suggest that advertising originally intended for consumers has a nonnegligible effect on financial markets. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (4) , 2465-2484
Background Noise? TV Advertising Affects Real-Time Investor Behavior
Using minute-by-minute TV advertising data covering some 300 firms, 327,000 ads, and $20 billion in ad spending, we study the real-time effects of TV advertising on investors’ searches for online financial information and subsequent trading activity. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that viewers in different U.S. time zones are exposed to the same programming and national advertising at different times, allowing us to control for contemporaneous confounding events. We find that an average TV ad leads to a 3% increase in EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) system queries and an 8% increase in Google searches for financial information within 15 minutes of the airing of that ad. These searches translate into larger trading volume on the advertiser’s stock, driven primarily by retail investors. The findings on retail investor ad-induced trading are corroborated with hourly data from Robinhood, a popular retail trading platform. We also show that ads induce searches and trading of companies other than the advertiser, including of close rivals. Altogether, our findings suggest that advertising originally intended for consumers has a nonnegligible effect on financial markets. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (2) , 742-768
How Does Firms’ Innovation Disclosure Affect Their Banking Relationships?
Firms face a trade-off between patenting, thereby disclosing innovation, and secrecy. We show that this trade-off interacts with firms’ financing choices. As a shock to innovation disclosure, we study the American Inventor’s Protection Act that made firms’ patent applications public 18 months after filing, rather than when granted. We find that such increased innovation disclosure helps firms switch lenders, resulting in lower cost of debt, and facilitates their access to syndicated-loan and public capital markets. Our evidence lends support to the idea that public-information provision through patents and private information in financial relationships are substitutes, and that innovation disclosure makes credit markets more contestable. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 67 (2) , 742-768
How Does Firms’ Innovation Disclosure Affect Their Banking Relationships?
Firms face a trade-off between patenting, thereby disclosing innovation, and secrecy. We show that this trade-off interacts with firms’ financing choices. As a shock to innovation disclosure, we study the American Inventor’s Protection Act that made firms’ patent applications public 18 months after filing, rather than when granted. We find that such increased innovation disclosure helps firms switch lenders, resulting in lower cost of debt, and facilitates their access to syndicated-loan and public capital markets. Our evidence lends support to the idea that public-information provision through patents and private information in financial relationships are substitutes, and that innovation disclosure makes credit markets more contestable. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
- Top Cited Papers
- 20 February 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 58 (2) , 295-332
Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations
We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.
- 20 February 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 58 (2) , 295-332
Top Cited PapersCorporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations
We empirically study how collusion in product markets affects firms' financial disclosure strategies. We find that after a rise in cartel enforcement, U.S. firms start sharing more detailed information in their financial disclosure about their customers, contracts, and products. This new information potentially benefits peers by helping to tacitly coordinate actions in product markets. Indeed, changes in disclosure are associated with higher future profitability. Our results highlight the potential conflict between securities and antitrust regulations.
- 8 October 2019
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 50 (4) , 883-915
The effects of global leniency programs on margins and mergers
In a cross‐country study, we investigate how staggered passage of national leniency programs from 1990–2012 has affected firms’ margins and merger activity. We find that these programs, which give amnesty to cartel conspirators that cooperate with antitrust authorities, reduced the gross margins of the affected firms. However, firms reacted to new regulations by engaging in more mergers that had negative effects on downstream firms. Our results imply that although these programs were generally effective, their full potential was mitigated by mergers that substitute for cartels, and that a strong merger review process might be a prerequisite for strengthening anti‐collusion enforcement.
- 8 October 2019
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 50 (4) , 883-915
The effects of global leniency programs on margins and mergers
In a cross‐country study, we investigate how staggered passage of national leniency programs from 1990–2012 has affected firms’ margins and merger activity. We find that these programs, which give amnesty to cartel conspirators that cooperate with antitrust authorities, reduced the gross margins of the affected firms. However, firms reacted to new regulations by engaging in more mergers that had negative effects on downstream firms. Our results imply that although these programs were generally effective, their full potential was mitigated by mergers that substitute for cartels, and that a strong merger review process might be a prerequisite for strengthening anti‐collusion enforcement.