A liar-like paradox for rational reflection principles
- 10 February 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (2) , 292-300
Abstract
This article shows that there is a liar-like paradox that arises for rational credence that relies only on very weak logical and credal principles. The paradox depends on a weak rational reflection principle, logical principles governing conjunction and principles governing the relationship between rational credence and proof. To respond to this paradox, we must either reject even very weak rational reflection principles or reject some highly plausible logical or credal principle.Keywords
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