Joshua Schechter
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Joshua Schechter has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Christopher S. Hill
2 shared publications- David Enoch
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 113 (2) , 311-326
Rational Defeat Beyond Belief
Epistemologists typically discuss defeat as applying to beliefs and other cognitive states. But many other kinds of mental states can also be defeated, including emotions. This article argues that there are strong structural analogies between the rational defeat of beliefs and the rational defeat of other kinds of mental states, analogies that call for a unified explanation. In the case of belief, there are at least three ways evidence can have a defeating effect: It can act as a rebutter, an undercutter, or a higher‐order defeater. Many other kinds of mental states can also be defeated in each of these three ways. This suggests that there is a general account of rational defeat that applies across mental states. This article develops such an account, according to which defeat concerns the fittingness of mental states.
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 113 (2) , 311-326
Rational Defeat Beyond Belief
Epistemologists typically discuss defeat as applying to beliefs and other cognitive states. But many other kinds of mental states can also be defeated, including emotions. This article argues that there are strong structural analogies between the rational defeat of beliefs and the rational defeat of other kinds of mental states, analogies that call for a unified explanation. In the case of belief, there are at least three ways evidence can have a defeating effect: It can act as a rebutter, an undercutter, or a higher‐order defeater. Many other kinds of mental states can also be defeated in each of these three ways. This suggests that there is a general account of rational defeat that applies across mental states. This article develops such an account, according to which defeat concerns the fittingness of mental states.
- 10 February 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (2) , 292-300
A liar-like paradox for rational reflection principles
This article shows that there is a liar-like paradox that arises for rational credence that relies only on very weak logical and credal principles. The paradox depends on a weak rational reflection principle, logical principles governing conjunction and principles governing the relationship between rational credence and proof. To respond to this paradox, we must either reject even very weak rational reflection principles or reject some highly plausible logical or credal principle.
- 10 February 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 84 (2) , 292-300
A liar-like paradox for rational reflection principles
This article shows that there is a liar-like paradox that arises for rational credence that relies only on very weak logical and credal principles. The paradox depends on a weak rational reflection principle, logical principles governing conjunction and principles governing the relationship between rational credence and proof. To respond to this paradox, we must either reject even very weak rational reflection principles or reject some highly plausible logical or credal principle.
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 53 (2) , 411-461
Supervaluationism, Modal Logic, and Weakly Classical Logic
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 53 (2) , 411-461
Supervaluationism, Modal Logic, and Weakly Classical Logic
- 8 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (1) , 153-178
Epistemic characterizations of validity and level-bridging principles
- 8 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (1) , 153-178
Epistemic characterizations of validity and level-bridging principles
- Open Access
- 19 February 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 254-278
Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods
We rely on belief-forming mechanisms: modus ponens, inference to the best explanation, and the transformation rules of our perceptual system. Why are we entitled to rely on these mechanisms? This chapter criticizes Method Internalist answers. Extreme Method Internalism launches a regress. Defense Internalism also launches a regress and has other limitation. Mentalism (Mental Internalist) is motivated by demon world cases, but better (non-internalist) treatments of such cases are possible.
- 19 February 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 254-278
Open AccessInternalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods
We rely on belief-forming mechanisms: modus ponens, inference to the best explanation, and the transformation rules of our perceptual system. Why are we entitled to rely on these mechanisms? This chapter criticizes Method Internalist answers. Extreme Method Internalism launches a regress. Defense Internalism also launches a regress and has other limitation. Mentalism (Mental Internalist) is motivated by demon world cases, but better (non-internalist) treatments of such cases are possible.
- 21 October 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 16 (4) , 438-452
Aiming at Aptness
This paper discusses Ernest Sosa's account of knowledge and epistemic normativity. The paper has two main parts. The first part identifies places where Sosa's account requires supplementation if it is going to capture important epistemic phenomena. In particular, additional theoretical resources are needed to explain (i) the way in which epistemic aims are genuinely good aims, and (ii) the way in which some forms of reasoning can be epistemically better than others even when they are equally conducive to attaining the truth. The second part focuses on Sosa's claim that there is a kind of belief – judgmental belief – that doesn't merely aim at truth but also aims at aptness, and that this kind of belief is central to our mental lives. The paper raises several concerns about this part of Sosa's account, including the concern that aiming at aptness is overly self-directed, and so is more closely tied to vice than epistemic virtue.
- 21 October 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 16 (4) , 438-452
Aiming at Aptness
This paper discusses Ernest Sosa's account of knowledge and epistemic normativity. The paper has two main parts. The first part identifies places where Sosa's account requires supplementation if it is going to capture important epistemic phenomena. In particular, additional theoretical resources are needed to explain (i) the way in which epistemic aims are genuinely good aims, and (ii) the way in which some forms of reasoning can be epistemically better than others even when they are equally conducive to attaining the truth. The second part focuses on Sosa's claim that there is a kind of belief – judgmental belief – that doesn't merely aim at truth but also aims at aptness, and that this kind of belief is central to our mental lives. The paper raises several concerns about this part of Sosa's account, including the concern that aiming at aptness is overly self-directed, and so is more closely tied to vice than epistemic virtue.
- 18 April 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 152-177
Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought
- 18 April 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 152-177
Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought
- 6 September 2018
- Published by Wiley in Philosophical Issues
- Vol. 28 (1) , 325-347
IS THERE A RELIABILITY CHALLENGE FOR LOGIC?
- 6 September 2018
- Published by Wiley in Philosophical Issues
- Vol. 28 (1) , 325-347
IS THERE A RELIABILITY CHALLENGE FOR LOGIC?
- 21 December 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
No Need for Excuses
This chapter discusses the viability of knowledge-first epistemology. The chapter has two parts. The first part presents several big-picture objections to knowledge-first epistemology and argues that while these considerations are pressing, they are not conclusive. The second part focuses on a specific thesis endorsed by many knowledge-first epistemologists—the knowledge norm of assertion. The chapter considers a familiar concern with this norm: It can be appropriate for someone who has a justified belief that p, but doesn’t know that p, to assert that p. Proponents of the knowledge norm typically explain away such judgments by claiming that the assertion is improper but the subject has an excuse for making it. The chapter argues against this response. The chapter concludes by briefly considering whether we should replace the knowledge norm with an alternative. It argues that that there is no norm specifically tied to assertion.
- 21 December 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
No Need for Excuses
This chapter discusses the viability of knowledge-first epistemology. The chapter has two parts. The first part presents several big-picture objections to knowledge-first epistemology and argues that while these considerations are pressing, they are not conclusive. The second part focuses on a specific thesis endorsed by many knowledge-first epistemologists—the knowledge norm of assertion. The chapter considers a familiar concern with this norm: It can be appropriate for someone who has a justified belief that p, but doesn’t know that p, to assert that p. Proponents of the knowledge norm typically explain away such judgments by claiming that the assertion is improper but the subject has an excuse for making it. The chapter argues against this response. The chapter concludes by briefly considering whether we should replace the knowledge norm with an alternative. It argues that that there is no norm specifically tied to assertion.
- 24 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 443-458
Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics
There are several important arguments in metaethics that rely on explanatory considerations. Gilbert Harman has presented a challenge to the existence of moral facts that depends on the claim that the best explanation of our moral beliefs does not involve moral facts. The Reliability Challenge against moral realism depends on the claim that moral realism is incompatible with there being a satisfying explanation of our reliability about moral truths. This chapter examines these and related arguments and discusses four kinds of arguments- Harman's Challenge, evolutionary debunking arguments, irrelevant influence arguments, and the Reliability Challenge- understood as arguments against moral realism. To be fair, evolution may have a role to play if the Reliability Challenge is targeted against moral naturalism. According to moral naturalism, moral facts are natural facts. So they can play a role in causing natural phenomena.
- 24 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 443-458
Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics
There are several important arguments in metaethics that rely on explanatory considerations. Gilbert Harman has presented a challenge to the existence of moral facts that depends on the claim that the best explanation of our moral beliefs does not involve moral facts. The Reliability Challenge against moral realism depends on the claim that moral realism is incompatible with there being a satisfying explanation of our reliability about moral truths. This chapter examines these and related arguments and discusses four kinds of arguments- Harman's Challenge, evolutionary debunking arguments, irrelevant influence arguments, and the Reliability Challenge- understood as arguments against moral realism. To be fair, evolution may have a role to play if the Reliability Challenge is targeted against moral naturalism. According to moral naturalism, moral facts are natural facts. So they can play a role in causing natural phenomena.