Agency and intervention
Open Access
- 19 September 2015
- journal article
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 370 (1677) , 20140215
Abstract
Novel ways to intervene on brain function raise questions about agency and responsibility. Here, I discuss whether direct brain interventions, and in particular, deep brain stimulation, pose a threat to agency in individual cases, or to our general conceptualization of what it is to be a responsible agent. While I do not currently see evidence that these interventions constitute a global challenge to our concept of agency, they do have the potential to diminish agency in individuals. I consider whether the lack of evidence for a global challenge ratifies our folk conceptions, or is a necessary consequence of them. In closing, I propose that our theoretical understanding of agency and our therapeutic approaches could be improved with a more nuanced, multidimensional view of agency.Keywords
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