The curse of accountability: Assessing relationships in the delivery of employment services
Author:
- 1 March 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Economic and Labour Relations Review
- Vol. 24 (1) , 64-79
Abstract
As governments move from being both a funder and provider of human services to a purchaser of services in private sector markets or quasi-markets, ensuring that providers do what they are supposed to do becomes more difficult. Agency theory and stewardship theory have been suggested as ways of overcoming this problem. This article argues that both are inadequate, particularly because they conceptualise the relationship as bilateral (government funding department and service provider), ignoring the role of clients in achieving organisational objectives. Co-production that recognises the role played by clients in the production of employment outcomes can provide a more useful way of thinking about relationships among key actors involved in the provision of employment services.Keywords
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