Confidence votes and executive dominance: the case of Italy
Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Parliamentary Affairs
Abstract
Governments have increasingly relied on confidence votes as a procedural tool to secure the passage of legislation in parliament. In this study, we investigate why executives resort to such votes, focusing on government bills in Italy between 1996 and 2023. Drawing on an original longitudinal dataset, we examine the conditions under which governments are more likely to invoke this formally exceptional instrument on individual bills. We argue that confidence votes, while ostensibly extraordinary, are often used strategically to manage or prevent coordination problems during the legislative process. In particular, we assess how intra-coalition policy heterogeneity, conflict surrounding government-sponsored bills, and the programmatic content of legislation influence the likelihood of tying a bill to a confidence vote. Our findings show that confidence procedures, originally designed for emergencies, have become routine instruments of governance that allow executives to maintain control over the legislative agenda and contain coalition tensions.Keywords
Funding Information
- PRIN 2020 Project DEMOPE—DEMOcracy under PressurE (2020NK2YHL)
- Italian Ministry of University and Research
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