Marco Improta
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Marco Improta has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elisabetta Mannoni
University of Siena
7 shared publications - Francesco Marangoni
Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences, University of Siena, Siena, Italy
4 shared publications - Vincenzo Emanuele
LUISS University
3 shared publications - Federico Trastulli
Italian Centre for Electoral Studies (CISE), LUISS Guido Carli
2 shared publications - Alessandro Chiaramonte
University of Florence
1 shared publication - Andrea Capati
Department of Political Science, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Parliamentary Affairs
Confidence votes and executive dominance: the case of Italy
Governments have increasingly relied on confidence votes as a procedural tool to secure the passage of legislation in parliament. In this study, we investigate why executives resort to such votes, focusing on government bills in Italy between 1996 and 2023. Drawing on an original longitudinal dataset, we examine the conditions under which governments are more likely to invoke this formally exceptional instrument on individual bills. We argue that confidence votes, while ostensibly extraordinary, are often used strategically to manage or prevent coordination problems during the legislative process. In particular, we assess how intra-coalition policy heterogeneity, conflict surrounding government-sponsored bills, and the programmatic content of legislation influence the likelihood of tying a bill to a confidence vote. Our findings show that confidence procedures, originally designed for emergencies, have become routine instruments of governance that allow executives to maintain control over the legislative agenda and contain coalition tensions.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Parliamentary Affairs
Open AccessConfidence votes and executive dominance: the case of Italy
Governments have increasingly relied on confidence votes as a procedural tool to secure the passage of legislation in parliament. In this study, we investigate why executives resort to such votes, focusing on government bills in Italy between 1996 and 2023. Drawing on an original longitudinal dataset, we examine the conditions under which governments are more likely to invoke this formally exceptional instrument on individual bills. We argue that confidence votes, while ostensibly extraordinary, are often used strategically to manage or prevent coordination problems during the legislative process. In particular, we assess how intra-coalition policy heterogeneity, conflict surrounding government-sponsored bills, and the programmatic content of legislation influence the likelihood of tying a bill to a confidence vote. Our findings show that confidence procedures, originally designed for emergencies, have become routine instruments of governance that allow executives to maintain control over the legislative agenda and contain coalition tensions.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Changing governments, stable elites? Executive personnel continuity in global perspective
In political science, government change is typically understood as a shift in who holds power, even though new cabinets may formally include many members of the previous governing elite. In this study, I differentiate institutional turnover from personnel turnover by reconstructing transitions between successive governments using the WhoGov dataset. I introduce an Executive Personnel Continuity Index (EPCI) that measures the similarity between outgoing and incoming ministerial rosters. I argue that leader succession functions as an executive reset: new leaders have incentives to establish control, reward loyalists, and signal political change. Party organizations, however, can insulate incumbent ministers from replacement. I test these expectations using descriptive evidence, country and transition-year fixed effects, equal-country weighting, entropy balancing and a transition-centered comparison with the outgoing government's own pre-transition continuity. Across the principal specifications, leader replacement is associated with a decline of approximately one-third in executive personnel continuity. The decline is limited under same-party succession, substantially larger across party boundaries and greatest under complete partisan alternation. The findings therefore indicate that a change in government translates into a substantive transformation of the elite mainly when it also unsettles the leadership and party bases of executive power, and this has significant consequences for political systems worldwide.
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessChanging governments, stable elites? Executive personnel continuity in global perspective
In political science, government change is typically understood as a shift in who holds power, even though new cabinets may formally include many members of the previous governing elite. In this study, I differentiate institutional turnover from personnel turnover by reconstructing transitions between successive governments using the WhoGov dataset. I introduce an Executive Personnel Continuity Index (EPCI) that measures the similarity between outgoing and incoming ministerial rosters. I argue that leader succession functions as an executive reset: new leaders have incentives to establish control, reward loyalists, and signal political change. Party organizations, however, can insulate incumbent ministers from replacement. I test these expectations using descriptive evidence, country and transition-year fixed effects, equal-country weighting, entropy balancing and a transition-centered comparison with the outgoing government's own pre-transition continuity. Across the principal specifications, leader replacement is associated with a decline of approximately one-third in executive personnel continuity. The decline is limited under same-party succession, substantially larger across party boundaries and greatest under complete partisan alternation. The findings therefore indicate that a change in government translates into a substantive transformation of the elite mainly when it also unsettles the leadership and party bases of executive power, and this has significant consequences for political systems worldwide.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 14
How Political Elites Think About Democracy: Evidence From Europe
Political elites are not only decision-makers but also key interpreters of democracy. Yet, we still know little about how they understand democracy across its different dimensions. Using an original elite survey from the REDIRECT project covering elected elites in eight European countries, we examine five conceptions of democracy: electoral, liberal, social, direct, and populist. Our findings show broad elite support for democracy, but important differences in how democracy is understood. Electoral and liberal democracy are widely shared, whereas direct and populist conceptions are more contested. Democratic views are shaped by both individual and contextual factors. Education strongly affects support for unmediated forms of democracy, while ideology matters mainly for social democracy. Evaluations of democratic performance and national contexts also influence elite understandings of democracy. Overall, we find both convergence and variation in elite democratic views. These findings have important implications for democratic representation in contemporary Europe.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 14
Open AccessHow Political Elites Think About Democracy: Evidence From Europe
Political elites are not only decision-makers but also key interpreters of democracy. Yet, we still know little about how they understand democracy across its different dimensions. Using an original elite survey from the REDIRECT project covering elected elites in eight European countries, we examine five conceptions of democracy: electoral, liberal, social, direct, and populist. Our findings show broad elite support for democracy, but important differences in how democracy is understood. Electoral and liberal democracy are widely shared, whereas direct and populist conceptions are more contested. Democratic views are shaped by both individual and contextual factors. Education strongly affects support for unmediated forms of democracy, while ideology matters mainly for social democracy. Evaluations of democratic performance and national contexts also influence elite understandings of democracy. Overall, we find both convergence and variation in elite democratic views. These findings have important implications for democratic representation in contemporary Europe.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica
- Vol. 56 (2) , 1-11
Why so stable? Understanding the exceptional longevity of the Meloni government
Italy has long been a textbook case of government instability. Against this backdrop, the exceptional longevity of the Meloni government marks a clear reversal. However, the cabinet is ruling under the same institutional constraints that once made Italian governments short-lived and fragile. In this study, I seek to make sense of this exceptional stability tracing how potential stabilizing mechanisms have jointly operated across all the stages of the coalition life-cycle framework. Stability, I argue, has resulted from the convergence of multiple stabilizing mechanisms that have seldom aligned simultaneously in the Italian context. The main lesson from this deviant case lies in a paradox: Italy's most durable government in decades is promoting a constitutional reform intended to enhance stability, even though cohesive and disciplined coalitions can already achieve it without altering institutional rules.
- 5 March 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica
- Vol. 56 (2) , 1-11
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessWhy so stable? Understanding the exceptional longevity of the Meloni government
Italy has long been a textbook case of government instability. Against this backdrop, the exceptional longevity of the Meloni government marks a clear reversal. However, the cabinet is ruling under the same institutional constraints that once made Italian governments short-lived and fragile. In this study, I seek to make sense of this exceptional stability tracing how potential stabilizing mechanisms have jointly operated across all the stages of the coalition life-cycle framework. Stability, I argue, has resulted from the convergence of multiple stabilizing mechanisms that have seldom aligned simultaneously in the Italian context. The main lesson from this deviant case lies in a paradox: Italy's most durable government in decades is promoting a constitutional reform intended to enhance stability, even though cohesive and disciplined coalitions can already achieve it without altering institutional rules.
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 11
Macroeconomic imbalance procedure and technocratic appointments in national governments: insights from the Eurozone crisis
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative European Politics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 11
Macroeconomic imbalance procedure and technocratic appointments in national governments: insights from the Eurozone crisis
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- p. 1-21
From Bonn to third-wave democracies: transnational diffusion of the constructive vote of no-confidence
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- p. 1-21
From Bonn to third-wave democracies: transnational diffusion of the constructive vote of no-confidence
- Open Access
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Political Social Distance in Europe
In this study, we build on Emory Bogardus’ classical sociology of distance to develop a relational framework for understanding attitudes related to democratic coexistence. Extending his insight into the political realm, we frame political social distance as the (dis)comfort citizens feel toward supporters of the party they would never vote for, as in-laws, friends, co-workers, or neighbors. Using original survey data from eight European democracies, we show that social trust consistently reduces distance toward political outgroups, while ideological orientation influences this disposition asymmetrically: respondents on the left exhibit higher political social distance than those on the right. Moreover, citizens who attach strong importance to democracy display greater distance toward opponents, a paradox we term democratic exclusivism, grounded in a moral rather than procedural conception of democracy. These findings have important implications for democratic quality, as they reveal both the social foundations that may enable peaceful democratic coexistence and the attitudinal barriers that may gradually weaken it.
- 11 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessPolitical Social Distance in Europe
In this study, we build on Emory Bogardus’ classical sociology of distance to develop a relational framework for understanding attitudes related to democratic coexistence. Extending his insight into the political realm, we frame political social distance as the (dis)comfort citizens feel toward supporters of the party they would never vote for, as in-laws, friends, co-workers, or neighbors. Using original survey data from eight European democracies, we show that social trust consistently reduces distance toward political outgroups, while ideological orientation influences this disposition asymmetrically: respondents on the left exhibit higher political social distance than those on the right. Moreover, citizens who attach strong importance to democracy display greater distance toward opponents, a paradox we term democratic exclusivism, grounded in a moral rather than procedural conception of democracy. These findings have important implications for democratic quality, as they reveal both the social foundations that may enable peaceful democratic coexistence and the attitudinal barriers that may gradually weaken it.
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 62 (2) , 215-233
Who should govern the climate crisis? Citizen preferences for technocrats in the environment ministry
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Representation
- Vol. 62 (2) , 215-233
Who should govern the climate crisis? Citizen preferences for technocrats in the environment ministry
- Open Access
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Government and Opposition
- Vol. 61, 1-29
Rulers’ Age and the Stability of Governments: A Survival Analysis
In this study, we investigate the impact of the age of prime ministers and ministers on the stability of governments across 21 democracies. We examine this issue by using Cox survival analysis, leveraging an original dataset and adopting a comparative perspective. The findings of the study document that younger prime ministers face a lower risk of government discretionary termination compared to their older counterparts. This effect does not appear to be statistically significant for cabinet ministers. By shedding light on this uncharted relationship, we contribute to the flourishing literature on youth representation in politics and the established research agenda on the factors affecting the survival in office of democratic governments. We conclude the study by discussing the implications of the findings for democracy and suggesting avenues for future research.
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Government and Opposition
- Vol. 61, 1-29
Open AccessRulers’ Age and the Stability of Governments: A Survival Analysis
In this study, we investigate the impact of the age of prime ministers and ministers on the stability of governments across 21 democracies. We examine this issue by using Cox survival analysis, leveraging an original dataset and adopting a comparative perspective. The findings of the study document that younger prime ministers face a lower risk of government discretionary termination compared to their older counterparts. This effect does not appear to be statistically significant for cabinet ministers. By shedding light on this uncharted relationship, we contribute to the flourishing literature on youth representation in politics and the established research agenda on the factors affecting the survival in office of democratic governments. We conclude the study by discussing the implications of the findings for democracy and suggesting avenues for future research.
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Italian Politics
- Vol. 18 (2) , 307-325
Ghosted by politics? Young generations and the crisis of representation in Italy
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Italian Politics
- Vol. 18 (2) , 307-325
Ghosted by politics? Young generations and the crisis of representation in Italy