On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths
- 26 June 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (2) , 257-270
Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat‐race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez‐faire equilibrium is an equal‐utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.Keywords
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