Frédéric Gavrel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Frédéric Gavrel has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Isabelle Lebon
Compte-rendu de l'expérimentation des votes par approbation et par note lors des élections Saint-Étienne 2012 Strasbourg et Louvigny
8 shared publications - Antoinette Baujard
Université Jean Monnet
4 shared publications - Jean-François Laslier
CNRS, Paris School of Economics, Paris, France
3 shared publications - Thérèse Rebière
CERENE, Department of Economics, University of Le Havre, 25 rue Philippe Lebon, BP420, 76057 Le Havre cedex, France
3 shared publications Frédéric Gavrel
CREM UMR 6211 CNRS University of Caen Normandy Esplanade de la Paix 14000 Caen France
2 shared publications- Herrade Igersheim
CODE, Edifici B, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del Valles, Barcelona, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Directed search, mismatch and efficiency
This short paper provides a directed search model of the labor market in which the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not from a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the posted wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. But, under a binding condition, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.
Open AccessDirected search, mismatch and efficiency
This short paper provides a directed search model of the labor market in which the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not from a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the posted wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. But, under a binding condition, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.
- Open Access
Mismatch and Wage Posting
This paper provides a wage posting model of the labor market in which workers' search strategies are pure. To that end, the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the announced wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. Under a binding condition however, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.
Open AccessMismatch and Wage Posting
This paper provides a wage posting model of the labor market in which workers' search strategies are pure. To that end, the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the announced wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. Under a binding condition however, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 25 (2) , 404-411
The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 25 (2) , 404-411
The magic of layoff taxes requires equilibrium stability
- Open Access
Sincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems
In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules : the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters’ decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of “sincere” and “strategic” voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity.
Open AccessSincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems
In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules : the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters’ decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of “sincere” and “strategic” voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity.
- 26 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (2) , 257-270
On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat‐race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez‐faire equilibrium is an equal‐utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
- 26 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (2) , 257-270
On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat‐race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez‐faire equilibrium is an equal‐utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
- Open Access
On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
Open AccessOn the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
- Open Access
Keeping Up with the Joneses as an Outcome of Getting Ahead of the Smiths. A Two-Stage Veblenian Status Game
In a status game, homogenous individuals first decide on their income (and on the effort necessary to that end) with the aim at Getting ahead of the Smithes (GAS). Next, they make use of a pure positional good to make incomes visible. Although the GAS hypothesis is ordinal, the signalling costs induce cardinal social concerns. The GAS hypothesis, translated into the KUJ (Keeping Up with the Joneses) (pride) concern, generates an equilibrium in which identical agents have unequal income levels. This equilibrium is an egalitarian optimum. But utilitarian and Paretian inefficiency are the price paid for equality.
Open AccessKeeping Up with the Joneses as an Outcome of Getting Ahead of the Smiths. A Two-Stage Veblenian Status Game
In a status game, homogenous individuals first decide on their income (and on the effort necessary to that end) with the aim at Getting ahead of the Smithes (GAS). Next, they make use of a pure positional good to make incomes visible. Although the GAS hypothesis is ordinal, the signalling costs induce cardinal social concerns. The GAS hypothesis, translated into the KUJ (Keeping Up with the Joneses) (pride) concern, generates an equilibrium in which identical agents have unequal income levels. This equilibrium is an egalitarian optimum. But utilitarian and Paretian inefficiency are the price paid for equality.
- 10 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 117 (4) , 1281-1305
Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage
In this paper, we re‐examine the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search‐matching model with bargained wages and free entry. Assuming that firms hire their best applicants, we show that participation is always too low. The reason for this is a hold‐up phenomenon: to be active, a worker must pay the entire search cost whereas part of the gain from this investment goes to the firm. As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation, job creation, and employment. Therefore, net aggregate income of the economy is increased.
- 10 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 117 (4) , 1281-1305
Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage
In this paper, we re‐examine the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search‐matching model with bargained wages and free entry. Assuming that firms hire their best applicants, we show that participation is always too low. The reason for this is a hold‐up phenomenon: to be active, a worker must pay the entire search cost whereas part of the gain from this investment goes to the firm. As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation, job creation, and employment. Therefore, net aggregate income of the economy is increased.
- Open Access
On the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of Going Ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to go ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, an utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
Open AccessOn the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of Going Ahead of the Smiths
This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to go ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, an utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.
- Open Access
Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election
Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons : the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.
Open AccessWho's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election
Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons : the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.