FGFrédéric Gavrel

Frédéric Gavrel

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Frédéric Gavrel has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

    • 29 March 2019
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Directed search, mismatch and efficiency

    by Frédéric Gavrel, Frederic Gavrel

    This short paper provides a directed search model of the labor market in which the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not from a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the posted wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. But, under a binding condition, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.

    • 30 September 2018
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Mismatch and Wage Posting

    by Frédéric Gavrel, Frederic Gavrel

    This paper provides a wage posting model of the labor market in which workers' search strategies are pure. To that end, the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the announced wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. Under a binding condition however, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.

    • 1 January 2018
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Sincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems

    by Isabelle Lebon, Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, Jean-François Laslier

    In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules : the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters’ decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of “sincere” and “strategic” voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity.

  • On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths

    by Frédéric Gavrel, Thérèse Rebière

    This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat‐race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez‐faire equilibrium is an equal‐utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.


  • Open Access

    On the equilibrium and welfare consequences of getting ahead of the Smiths

    by Frédéric Gavrel, Thérèse Rebière

    This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to get ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, a utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.

    • 24 May 2016
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Keeping Up with the Joneses as an Outcome of Getting Ahead of the Smiths. A Two-Stage Veblenian Status Game

    by Frédéric Gavrel

    In a status game, homogenous individuals first decide on their income (and on the effort necessary to that end) with the aim at Getting ahead of the Smithes (GAS). Next, they make use of a pure positional good to make incomes visible. Although the GAS hypothesis is ordinal, the signalling costs induce cardinal social concerns. The GAS hypothesis, translated into the KUJ (Keeping Up with the Joneses) (pride) concern, generates an equilibrium in which identical agents have unequal income levels. This equilibrium is an egalitarian optimum. But utilitarian and Paretian inefficiency are the price paid for equality.

  • Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage

    by Frédéric Gavrel

    In this paper, we re‐examine the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search‐matching model with bargained wages and free entry. Assuming that firms hire their best applicants, we show that participation is always too low. The reason for this is a hold‐up phenomenon: to be active, a worker must pay the entire search cost whereas part of the gain from this investment goes to the firm. As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation, job creation, and employment. Therefore, net aggregate income of the economy is increased.


  • Open Access

    On the Equilibrium and Welfare Consequences of Going Ahead of the Smiths

    by Frédéric Gavrel, Thérèse Rebière

    This paper provides an analysis of the social consequences of people seeking to go ahead of the Smiths. All individuals attempt to reach a higher rank than the Smiths, including the Smiths themselves. This attitude gives rise to an equilibrium in which all individuals have equal utilities but unequal (gross) incomes. Due to a rat-race effect, individuals devote too much energy to climbing the social scale. However, laissez-faire equilibrium is an equal-utility constrained social optimum. Conversely, an utilitarian social planner would not choose utility equality. Unexpectedly, this social ambition theory fairly well accounts for empirical intermediate wage inequality.

    • 3 December 2014
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

    by Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, Jean-François Laslier, Isabelle Lebon

    Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons : the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.