Do reasoning limitations undermine discourse?
- 28 September 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Thinking & Reasoning
- Vol. 24 (1) , 97-116
Abstract
Why does discourse so often seem shallow, with people arguing past one another more than with one another? Might contributing causes be individual and logical rather than only dialogical? We consider here whether there exist errors in reasoning that could be particularly damaging in their effects on argumentive discourse. In particular, we examine implications for discourse of two such errors – explanation as a replacement for evidence and neglecting the likelihood of multiple causes contributing to an outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, we show these errors to be prevalent in a cross section of adults, as well as samples of community college students and young adolescents, with minimal age-related improvement. They also occur, although less frequently, among a sample of highly educated adults, and in Study 3, we examine their role in the discourse of college-educated adults. We point finally to evidence that these individual reasoning errors are potentially addressable through education.Keywords
This publication has 33 references indexed in Scilit:
- Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theoryBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 2011
- Dialogic Argumentation as a Vehicle for Developing Young Adolescents’ ThinkingPsychological Science, 2011
- Causal discounting in the presence of a stronger cue is due to biasPsychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2010
- The Importance of Learning About Knowing: Creating a Foundation for Development of Intellectual ValuesChild Development Perspectives, 2009
- Understanding BeliefsPolitical Psychology, 2006
- Discounting and ConditionalizationPsychological Science, 2005
- The Development of Argumentive Discourse SkillDiscourse Processes, 2001
- Explanation and Evidence in Informal ArgumentCognitive Science, 2000
- Reasoning and conversation.Psychological Review, 1998
- The role of covariation versus mechanism information in causal attributionCognition, 1995