The evolution of peace (and war) is driven by an elementary social interaction mechanism
- 15 January 2024
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 47, e7
Abstract
Here we revise Glowacki's model by proposing a simple and empirically tested mechanism that is applicable to a comprehensive set of social interactions. This parsimonious mechanism accounts for the choice of both cooperative and peaceful alternatives and explains when each choice benefits the interacting parties. It is proposed that this mechanism is key to the evolution of both peace and conflict.Keywords
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