Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment
Author:
- 19 April 2011
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 451-473
Abstract
In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.Keywords
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