Bing Jing
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Bing Jing has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gangshu (George) Cai
Santa Clara University
1 shared publication - Xiangfeng Chen
School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication - Z. John Zhang
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
1 shared publication - Zhong Wen
School of Economics and Management Tsinghua University Beijing 100084 China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 37 (3) , 469-483
Showrooming and Webrooming: Information Externalities Between Online and Offline Sellers
In a product market where consumers are open to uninformed purchases, we study competition between a traditional and an online retailer in the presence of showrooming. Several results are obtained. First, showrooming intensifies competition and lowers both firms’ profits, thus supporting traditional and online retailers’ recent strategy of carrying more exclusive varieties. Second, lowering consumer search costs may aggravate showrooming and decrease the traditional retailer’s profits for intermediate search costs. Third, opening an online store expands the demand of the traditional retailer but intensifies competition, thus lowering its profits under certain conditions. Fourth, a return policy by the online retailer alleviates showrooming and relaxes competition but weakly reduces its demand, increasing its profits only for intermediate search costs. The return policy (weakly) increases the traditional retailer’s profits. Fifth, when search cost is not high enough, price matching by the traditional retailer may also intensify competition and hurt its profits. We then examine how webrooming interacts with showrooming. When webrooming resolves partial match uncertainty, it may increase both firms’ profits by inducing more consumers to participate. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2018.1084 .
- 1 June 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 37 (3) , 469-483
Top Cited PapersShowrooming and Webrooming: Information Externalities Between Online and Offline Sellers
In a product market where consumers are open to uninformed purchases, we study competition between a traditional and an online retailer in the presence of showrooming. Several results are obtained. First, showrooming intensifies competition and lowers both firms’ profits, thus supporting traditional and online retailers’ recent strategy of carrying more exclusive varieties. Second, lowering consumer search costs may aggravate showrooming and decrease the traditional retailer’s profits for intermediate search costs. Third, opening an online store expands the demand of the traditional retailer but intensifies competition, thus lowering its profits under certain conditions. Fourth, a return policy by the online retailer alleviates showrooming and relaxes competition but weakly reduces its demand, increasing its profits only for intermediate search costs. The return policy (weakly) increases the traditional retailer’s profits. Fifth, when search cost is not high enough, price matching by the traditional retailer may also intensify competition and hurt its profits. We then examine how webrooming interacts with showrooming. When webrooming resolves partial match uncertainty, it may increase both firms’ profits by inducing more consumers to participate. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2018.1084 .
- Top Cited Papers
- 29 March 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 21 (6) , 1090-1101
Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint
There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer's internal capital level increases.
- 29 March 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 21 (6) , 1090-1101
Top Cited PapersEquilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint
There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer's internal capital level increases.
- 4 June 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 403-427
Seller honesty and product line pricing
- 4 June 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 403-427
Seller honesty and product line pricing
- 19 April 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 451-473
Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment
In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.
- 19 April 2011
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 451-473
Pricing Experience Goods: The Effects of Customer Recognition and Commitment
In a two‐period model of nondurable experience goods, we compare the profit and social welfare effects of behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD) and price commitment (PC) (relative to time‐consistent pricing) in a monopoly. We find that when the static, full‐information monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean consumer valuation, PC yields higher (lower) profits and social welfare than BBPD. We also identify the market conditions under which BBPD does not increase firm profits and provide an explanation as to when the firm should discriminate against its first‐time and repeat customers, respectively.
- 13 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 9 (3) , 275-299
Product line competition and price promotions
- 13 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 9 (3) , 275-299
Product line competition and price promotions
- 14 August 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 17 (3) , 683-707
Finitely Loyal Customers, Switchers, and Equilibrium Price Promotion
This present paper aims to provide some new perspectives on how firms' price promotional decisions may depend on different levels of brand loyalty and switcher population. We present a duopoly model with a segment of price‐sensitive switchers and a segment of customers who are loyal to one of the two brands but have limited brand loyalty. Our unique equilibrium splits into three types, depending upon configurations of brand strength and switcher population. The type of equilibrium for high brand loyalty corresponds to the one in Narasimhan. The remaining two types for intermediate and low brand loyalty demonstrate strikingly different properties. First, the strong brand has a higher price range and a higher regular price. Second, the strong brand has a higher (lower) average promotional depth than the weak brand when the switcher population is small (large). Third, both brands promote equally frequently when brand loyalty is relatively low.
- 14 August 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 17 (3) , 683-707
Finitely Loyal Customers, Switchers, and Equilibrium Price Promotion
This present paper aims to provide some new perspectives on how firms' price promotional decisions may depend on different levels of brand loyalty and switcher population. We present a duopoly model with a segment of price‐sensitive switchers and a segment of customers who are loyal to one of the two brands but have limited brand loyalty. Our unique equilibrium splits into three types, depending upon configurations of brand strength and switcher population. The type of equilibrium for high brand loyalty corresponds to the one in Narasimhan. The remaining two types for intermediate and low brand loyalty demonstrate strikingly different properties. First, the strong brand has a higher price range and a higher regular price. Second, the strong brand has a higher (lower) average promotional depth than the weak brand when the switcher population is small (large). Third, both brands promote equally frequently when brand loyalty is relatively low.