The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Author:
- 2 November 2000
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 168-220
Abstract
Applies the results of Ch. 7 to scientific methodology and shows that they give a logical interpretation of the subjective Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This theory is therefore no more necessarily subjective than deductive logic, consisting as both do of objective logical rules for proceeding from premises to conclusion. In the Bayesian case, the premises are prior probability assignments. It is shown that familiar rules of scientific method are endorsed, and, in particular, the rule that unless there is prior support for a hypothesis, its overall probability will be very small however good the fit with current evidence.Keywords
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