Colin Howson
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The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
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Latest Publications
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 168-220
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Applies the results of Ch. 7 to scientific methodology and shows that they give a logical interpretation of the subjective Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This theory is therefore no more necessarily subjective than deductive logic, consisting as both do of objective logical rules for proceeding from premises to conclusion. In the Bayesian case, the premises are prior probability assignments. It is shown that familiar rules of scientific method are endorsed, and, in particular, the rule that unless there is prior support for a hypothesis, its overall probability will be very small however good the fit with current evidence.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 168-220
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Applies the results of Ch. 7 to scientific methodology and shows that they give a logical interpretation of the subjective Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This theory is therefore no more necessarily subjective than deductive logic, consisting as both do of objective logical rules for proceeding from premises to conclusion. In the Bayesian case, the premises are prior probability assignments. It is shown that familiar rules of scientific method are endorsed, and, in particular, the rule that unless there is prior support for a hypothesis, its overall probability will be very small however good the fit with current evidence.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 121-167
‘A New Species of Logic’
This is the central chapter of the book. It contains an extended argument to show that in formal probability theory we have an authentic logic of uncertain inference, of the same species as deductive logic. A soundness and completeness theorem is given for this logic, akin to the soundness and completeness theorems of deductive logic. The logical view of probability was propounded by Leibniz in the seventeenth century, and revived in the twentieth century by Keynes, Carnap, and Ramsey. It is Ramsey's view, that the rules of probability are consistency constraints, that is upheld.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 121-167
‘A New Species of Logic’
This is the central chapter of the book. It contains an extended argument to show that in formal probability theory we have an authentic logic of uncertain inference, of the same species as deductive logic. A soundness and completeness theorem is given for this logic, akin to the soundness and completeness theorems of deductive logic. The logical view of probability was propounded by Leibniz in the seventeenth century, and revived in the twentieth century by Keynes, Carnap, and Ramsey. It is Ramsey's view, that the rules of probability are consistency constraints, that is upheld.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 109-120
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Considers another popular way of evading the force of Hume's argument, Naturalism. According to this doctrine, Hume merely shows why we must give up trying to find top–down justifications for our scientific procedures. Instead, we should use scientific procedures to investigate ways of acquiring knowledge. Naturalism is closely related to Reliabilism, like it claiming that the ordinary canons of evidence are all we need to underwrite the reliability of ordinary inductive procedures. These claims are investigated and shown to rest on a version of the Naturalistic Fallacy.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 109-120
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Considers another popular way of evading the force of Hume's argument, Naturalism. According to this doctrine, Hume merely shows why we must give up trying to find top–down justifications for our scientific procedures. Instead, we should use scientific procedures to investigate ways of acquiring knowledge. Naturalism is closely related to Reliabilism, like it claiming that the ordinary canons of evidence are all we need to underwrite the reliability of ordinary inductive procedures. These claims are investigated and shown to rest on a version of the Naturalistic Fallacy.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 94-108
Deductivism
Discusses the view, often called Deductivism, put forward independently by the philosopher Karl Popper and the statistician and geneticist R. A. Fisher, that deductive logic suffices to tell us which is the best theory in the light of observational data. In Fisher's case, this view supported his theory of significance tests. Deductivism purports to be a radical solution of Hume's problem because, according to it, there are no specifically inductive inferences. This, and the related views of the statisticians Neyman and Pearson, are shown to be untenable.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 94-108
Deductivism
Discusses the view, often called Deductivism, put forward independently by the philosopher Karl Popper and the statistician and geneticist R. A. Fisher, that deductive logic suffices to tell us which is the best theory in the light of observational data. In Fisher's case, this view supported his theory of significance tests. Deductivism purports to be a radical solution of Hume's problem because, according to it, there are no specifically inductive inferences. This, and the related views of the statisticians Neyman and Pearson, are shown to be untenable.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 61-93
Probabilism
Considers whether probability theory offers a way round Hume's argument, as has sometimes been contended. There are theorems of formal probability theory that appear to show that suitable evidence must increase the probability of the predicting theory, though when these theorems are examined they are all seen to have substantive assumptions, usually that some putative law has non‐zero prior probability. As such, they merely corroborate Hume's thesis that any inductive argument will contain explicitly or implicitly at least one inductive premise.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 61-93
Probabilism
Considers whether probability theory offers a way round Hume's argument, as has sometimes been contended. There are theorems of formal probability theory that appear to show that suitable evidence must increase the probability of the predicting theory, though when these theorems are examined they are all seen to have substantive assumptions, usually that some putative law has non‐zero prior probability. As such, they merely corroborate Hume's thesis that any inductive argument will contain explicitly or implicitly at least one inductive premise.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 35-60
Realism and the No‐Miracles Argument
Considers the increasingly popular, so‐called ‘No‐Miracles’ argument that we do have a valid inductive argument for supposing that our current theories, at any rate in physics, are substantially, if not wholly, true: it would be incredibly improbable that theories very far from the truth could make such extremely precise predictions, verified experimentally up to one part in a billion. Such ‘miracles’ of chance agreement can clearly be ruled out as themselves too improbable to be true. This apparently plausible argument is examined carefully and shown to consist in a number of separate steps, all of which are fallacious.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 35-60
Realism and the No‐Miracles Argument
Considers the increasingly popular, so‐called ‘No‐Miracles’ argument that we do have a valid inductive argument for supposing that our current theories, at any rate in physics, are substantially, if not wholly, true: it would be incredibly improbable that theories very far from the truth could make such extremely precise predictions, verified experimentally up to one part in a billion. Such ‘miracles’ of chance agreement can clearly be ruled out as themselves too improbable to be true. This apparently plausible argument is examined carefully and shown to consist in a number of separate steps, all of which are fallacious.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 22-34
Reliabilism
Considers the popular doctrine of reliabilism, the thesis that distinguishing between internal and external guarantees of reliability dissolves Hume's problem, since there may well be an external guarantee, in the way the world actually is, of the reliability of standard inductive practice. Indeed, we have good evidence that the world is so constituted to favour these practices. Furthermore, regarding the past predictive success of inductive inferences as good evidence of the reliability of the procedure of inductive inference itself is no less circular than using deductive arguments to justify deductive inference. These claims are examined and rejected.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 22-34
Reliabilism
Considers the popular doctrine of reliabilism, the thesis that distinguishing between internal and external guarantees of reliability dissolves Hume's problem, since there may well be an external guarantee, in the way the world actually is, of the reliability of standard inductive practice. Indeed, we have good evidence that the world is so constituted to favour these practices. Furthermore, regarding the past predictive success of inductive inferences as good evidence of the reliability of the procedure of inductive inference itself is no less circular than using deductive arguments to justify deductive inference. These claims are examined and rejected.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 6-21
Hume's Argument
Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is presented, and some ‘quick’ rejoinders to it are considered. Two of the most popular are (1) that it begs the question that only deductive arguments are valid, and omits consideration of probabilistic arguments, and (2) that inductive reasoning is partly constitutive of what we mean by valid inference, and so needs no independent justification. Both these rejoinders are rejected (1) because an examination of Hume's text clearly shows that he was talking about any sort of putatively sound argumentation, including probabilistic arguments; and (2) because it misses the point, which is to show why we can reliably expect the course of nature to continue in the way predicted on the basis of past evidence.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 6-21
Hume's Argument
Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is presented, and some ‘quick’ rejoinders to it are considered. Two of the most popular are (1) that it begs the question that only deductive arguments are valid, and omits consideration of probabilistic arguments, and (2) that inductive reasoning is partly constitutive of what we mean by valid inference, and so needs no independent justification. Both these rejoinders are rejected (1) because an examination of Hume's text clearly shows that he was talking about any sort of putatively sound argumentation, including probabilistic arguments; and (2) because it misses the point, which is to show why we can reliably expect the course of nature to continue in the way predicted on the basis of past evidence.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 241-246
Coda: ‘Of Miracles’
The coda discusses Hume's famous account of miracles in the Enquiry, and his criterion for belief in miracles, and shows that it amounts to a simple argument in the probability calculus.
- 2 November 2000
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 241-246
Coda: ‘Of Miracles’
The coda discusses Hume's famous account of miracles in the Enquiry, and his criterion for belief in miracles, and shows that it amounts to a simple argument in the probability calculus.